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SORTING OUT CIVIL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
AFTER PLAINS COMMERCE BANK: STATE COURTS AND
THE JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NAVAJO NATION
Dale Beck Furnish*
People need to be aware of the rightful place of Indian Nations.
- Chief Justice Herb Yazzie, Navajo Nation Supreme Court'
Introduction
On June 25, 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,2 applying Strate v. A-I
Contractors,3 decided eleven years before.4 Whereas the high court decided
Strate by unanimous vote, with the opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Plains Commerce created a 5-4 split, with Justice Ginsburg writing
the dissent. The Plains Commerce decision provides a convenient benchmark
for measuring the ongoing development of the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts
in the United States.
© 2009 Dale Beck Furnish
* Professor Emeritus, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
While I harbor no special pretensions as an Indian law scholar, for parts of four decades I have
taught at a law school where Indian law students are a significant part of the student body and
the faculty has included leading Indian law scholars like Rebecca Tsosie, Judge William C.
Canby, Jr., Robert N. Clinton, and Kevin Gover, among others. I long ago incorporated a
section on Indian Country in my Creditor-Debtor teaching materials. See DALE BECKFURNISH,
CREDITOR/DEBTOR RELATIONS: CASES & MATERIALS 354-416 (14th ed. 2003).
I owe a special debt to two research assistants who aided me in Spring 2007, Deborah Ann
Begay and Cherie Espinosa, both members of the Navajo Nation and of the class of 2007 at the
Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University. Their sure sense of their
traditions and their Navajo inheritance, combined with their increasing knowledge of the law,
have guided me to many revelations and insights.
1. Quoted in Gale Courey Toensing, Navajo Supreme Court Hears Controversial Long-
Arm Case, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Feb. 26, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.indian
country.com/archive/28207199.html.
2. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
3. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
4. Since Strate, three changes have occurred in Supreme Court personnel. Chief Justice
John Roberts replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Samuel Alito replaced Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor replaced Justice David Souter.
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Over the course of almost two centuries, Congress has steadily consigned
more and more felony criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian Country
to the federal courts, until for all practical purposes, tribal courts now exercise
none.' Civil jurisdiction is quite different. The last generation or two has seen
a steady development of tribal courts' capacity and exercise of civil
jurisdiction, encouraged by the Congress and the Executive. Those two
branches pursue policies that support tribal autonomy, including active tribal
courts. At the same time, a series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States might appear to limit the power of tribal courts to exercise civil
jurisdiction over parties and events that have significant contacts outside
Indian Country, regardless of significant contacts within Indian Country.6
Does Plains Commerce Bank further pare back tribal courts' civil
jurisdiction, just as more tribes have strengthened their legal systems and their
courts have begun increasingly to exercise jurisdiction over civil parties and
controversies? This article views Plains Commerce Bank as a misadventure
by our country's highest court, an inapposite precedent constricted by the
single, narrow issue it decided, hardly worthy of the ponderous process of
consideration by the Supreme Court of the United States. Further, it
demonstrates the relative permissiveness of the existing Supreme Court
precedents in the face of an assertive, artful tribal court.
This analysis has chosen the Navajo Nation tribal court system and its
emerging case law of civil jurisdiction to illustrate how tribal courts can derive
cogent doctrine in favor of expansive civil jurisdiction by faithfully applying
the Supreme Court's federal Indian law precedents of the last generation, up
to and including Plains Commerce Bank.7 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court,
beginning in 2003, has decided a series of cases dealing with the civil
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation tribal courts.8 These cases invoke federal
Indian law to define an assertive judicial sovereignty over civil parties and
controversies that have contacts with the Navajo Nation.
The emerging Navajo Nation case doctrine looms as important not only to
the Navajo Nation, but also to other tribes that may seek to establish vigorous
court systems. The Navajo opinions apply federal Indian law in ways other
5. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
6. See discussion infra notes 58-75, 157-76 and accompanying text.
7. The Navajo Supreme Court, in considering Todecheene v. FordMotor Co., No. SC-CV-
33-07 (Navajo 2008), asked the parties to brief the effects of the Plains Commerce Bank opinion
on the case before it. Id. at 4, available at http://www.navajocourts.org/NNCourtOpinions
2008/Ford%20v.%20Kayenta.pdf.
8. See discussion infra notes 234-312 and accompanying text.
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tribal courts might adopt, and the Navajo case law could work a revolution in
tribal civil jurisdiction throughout the United States if they are fully
understood and widely applied. They provide a framework for understanding
the negligible immediate impact of Plains Commerce Bank on tribal courts'
administration of civil justice, while at the same time providing a basis from
which to assess whether Plains Commerce Bank might portend future change
in Supreme Court doctrine.
The Navajo Context
The Navajo Reservation lies within the boundaries of the states of Arizona,
New Mexico, and Utah. Because of the Navajo Nation's status as a "domestic
dependent nation," 9 that geography creates two overlapping judicial systems
within portions of each state. Rather than jurisdictional neighbors separated
by state lines, such as Arizona and New Mexico, Indian Country creates
jurisdictional competitors, such as Aizona and the Navajo Reservation, on
ground reserved to the tribe but within the state.' ° In any given case or
controversy, one or more of the three state court systems may compete with
the Navajo courts for jurisdiction over the resulting civil lawsuit. Due to
Indians tribes' particular status in the federal system, a special set of
considerations are applied to resolve that competition. The competition for
civil jurisdiction takes on immediacy because sometimes the substantive law
rules for the resolution of a given case or controversy may vary depending on
which courthouse-state or tribal-issues the final judgment.
Until recently, there was no competition for civil jurisdiction between
Navajo courts and state courts. Before 1958, the Navajo Nation had no courts
to speak of, and thus had neither reason, nor means to have exercised civil
jurisdiction. In the fifty years since, the Navajo Nation has developed a strong
legal system and a vigorous, effective judiciary." Not surprisingly, that
9. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
10. Most maps do not show the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation. See, e.g., NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, ATLAS OF THE WORLD 32 (8th ed. 2004).
11. The advent of Navajo judicial independence coincides closely with adoption of tribal
autonomy as the durable Indian policy of the federal government. See Development of the
Navajo Courts, 8 Navajo Rptr. xxi (2009). This occurred after almost two centuries of
inconsistent, abusive, and ineffective Indian policy, vestiges of which still exist in the federal
system and memories of which create lasting distrust on the part of many Indians. Nonetheless,
today, federal Indian law does provide a stable framework for tribal government, and the Navajo
Nation has prospered within that framework.
Curiously, while the judicial branch of the federal government has chipped away at tribal
judicial autonomy, and still manifests apparent suspicion regarding tribal courts' due process
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development-and similar growth in other tribes' judicial systems-has given
rise to a series of judicial precedents from the Supreme Court of the United
States addressing the issue of tribal civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of
the Navajo Nation has had to assimilate that emerging case law as a necessary
part of working out its own judicial system. In turn, the advent of Navajo
and other guaranties, the Executive and the Congress have steadfastly supported tribal
autonomy in an unusually consistent manner for about halfa century. While many benchmarks
might be cited, in 1970 President Richard Nixon appeared before Congress decrying the
"historic and legal relationship between the federal government and Indian communities [that]
has oscillated between two equally harsh and unacceptable extremes," assimilation and
excessive dependence, and calling on Congress for new laws that would "strengthen the
Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community." President Richard
Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 564, 564, 567 (July 8, 1970),
reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 22,355 (1970). By 1975, Congress promulgated a "statement of
findings [and] Congressional declaration policy" that "the prolonged Federal domination of
Indian service programs has served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people
and their communities." 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450a(1)-(2) (2006). By 1977, the American Policy
Review Commission, established the year before, Pub. L. No 93-580, 88 Stat. 1910 (1976), had
reported to Congress and called for a "firm rejection of assimilationist [sic] policies,
reaffirmation of the status of tribes as permanent, self-governing institutions, and increased
financial aid to the tribes." WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
31 (4th ed. 2004). Perhaps amazingly, considering history, federal policy has unswervingly
supported tribal autonomy since. In 1994, President William Clinton issued a Memorandum
for the heads of all Executive Departments and Agencies instructing them to operate "within
a government-to-government relationship with federally registered Native American tribal
governments... reflecting respect for the rights of self-government due the sovereign tribal
governments." 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994). President Clinton issued further still-valid
Executive Orders, including an especially important one, toward the end of his time in the
White House. Exec. Order No. 13,175, Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9,2000). President George W.
Bush continued the policy. See 67 Fed. Reg. 67,773 (Nov. 6, 2002).
Today, then, most American Indian tribes retain a broad opportunity to pass their own laws
and apply them through their courts. As we shall see with the Navajo, the effectiveness of a
given tribe in taking advantage of that opportunity will vary with its degree of self-sufficiency,
which in turn depends on its economic resources and viability, in addition to the constituent will
of its people to take control of their own destiny. Today, the Navajo Nation enjoys its own
unique form of government and a highly developed legal system notable for its vigor and self-
definition.
Federal Indian law has not, however, gone out of its way to support the Navajo Nation's-or
any other tribe's-emergence as an independent legal system. The Navajo Nation has achieved
success in forging an indigenous legal system not because it always was encouraged to do so
by the federal government, but because it has remained committed to its tribal identity and has
been astute in exploiting the opportunities presented by federal Indian law. See Tom Tso, The
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tribal courts has pressured state courts to apply the same Supreme Court
precedents to sort out their civil jurisdiction over events and parties within
Indian Country. The placement of the Navajo Reservation on the Nation's
traditional home grounds thus gives rise to case law from four different "state"
court systems: Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and the Navajo Nation, a broad
base for analysis.
The boundaries of the Navajo Reservation encompass territory about the
size of West Virginia. 2 There is a membership of about 300,000 tribal
members, 13 who call themselves Ding.4 Perhaps because of its size in land
and people, or perhaps because of its will to survive as a people, the Navajo
Nation has forged a notably successful autonomous government structure,
including a strong judicial branch. 5
Navajo law finds its sources in extensive legislation and case precedent. It
includes much of the same substantive legislation, most of the same rules of
courtroom and pleading procedures, and many of the other ingredients that
characterize state legal systems throughout the United States, making up what
might be called "American law." 6 Navajo judges write their case opinions in
12. The reservation's total area comprises over 27,000 square miles, equal to just under a
fourth the size of Arizona. The Navajo Nation-History Page, http://www.navajo.org/history.
htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
13. The Navajo Nation is the second largest Indian tribe in the United States in number of
members, after the Cherokee. Encyclopedia-Navajo Indians, HISTORY.COM, http:/Iwww.
history.com/encyclopedia.do?vendorld=FWNE.fw..na018700.a#FWNE.fw..na0I8700.a (last
visited Aug. 28, 2009).
14. Dint means simply the "Navajo People." Glossary of Navajo Terms, 8 Navajo Rptr.
xxiii (2009). Din6 does not mean the Navajo government any more than "the public" means
"the government." Further, while the Navajo people constitute a tribe, their own term for their
collective membership is the "Navajo Nation." Research by assistants Deborah Ann Begay and
Cherie Espinosa (Spring 2007).
15. I have had the good fortune to teach at a law school with one of the largest contingents
of Native American law students in the United States. The special aspects of the Navajo system
have come home to me in the light of remarks by law students from other tribes, and the
respect-in some cases approaching awe-in which they hold the Navajo Nation. For example,
once I was advising a law student clerking for a tribal court and urging him that the court should
exercise jurisdiction regarding a commercial matter that had contacts both on and off the
reservation, noting that the Navajo Nation courts had done so in similar situations. He
responded, "Sure, the Navajos would, but nobody else can be like the Navajos."
16. The basis for the term "American law" is the homogeneity of the fifty states' legal
systems, consummated in the first half of the twentieth century by such events as the advent of
the American Law Institute and its Restatements of American Law. See generally LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2005); LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW
IN THE 20TH CENTuRY (2002); see also Willis L. M. Reese, Unification of Common Law Rules:
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English, making them accessible to biligaana17 jurists. The Navajo judicial
style resembles the "American" standard; indeed, most of the Navajo judiciary
graduated from "American" law schools.
Just as an "American" lawyer begins to feel comfortable in the Navajo legal
system, however, he or she runs into a series of distinguishing characteristics
that make it seem quite foreign. The Navajo Nation does not have a
constitution, nor is it subject to the United States Constitution. Even more
notably, pre-Columbian principles provide the system with its Fundamental
Law, the source of its most basic, overriding rules and attitudes.'9 This special
The Role of the American Law Institute, in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 171 (John Hazard & Wenceslas Wagner eds.,
1970); Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (abolishing "federal general common law" in
favor of that of the states); Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2075 (2006)) (adopting uniform rules of procedure and
evidence in federal courts); Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935). The state courts then adopted the federal rules, creating
uniformity in procedure. Today, United States jurists routinely approach a legal topic by
analyzing case law and statutes from all states as if they were one body of law. Additionally
a series of authoritative Restatements drafted by the American Law Institute sets out the
"American Law" of Contracts, Property, Torts, Trusts, Conflicts and most other major fields
of the law.
17. Anglo. Glossary of Navajo Terms, supra note 14.
18. On three different occasions, the Navajo Nation rejected proposed constitutions, in
1937, in 1953, and in 1968. See DAVID E. WILKINS, Dius BIBEEHAZ'AANII: A HANDBOOK OF
NAvAJO GOvERNMENT 51-52, 58-59 (1987). Despite the past efforts to create a constitution,
it appears that the Din6 have grown comfortable with a form of government in which "since [its]
powers are not defined, they are also not limited." Id. at 57.
The NavajoNation Code (NNC) does include, as Chapter 1 of its first Title, a Navajo Nation
Bill of Rights that tracks-but does not duplicate exactly-that of the first ten amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. See NAvAO NATION CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-9 (2005). These provisions
complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-202, 82 Stat.
73, 77-78 (1968), which provided "constitutional rights" (consisting of most of the U.S.
Constitution's Bill of Rights guaranties) that no Indian tribe might abrogate in its exercise of
self government. See ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(l)-(10) (2006).
19. The Navajo Nation and its legal system tend to perceive individual interests, where the
American legal culture perceives individual rights. The individual's interests, then, exist as
defined within group interests. Navajo law assumes as part of its fundamental task the necessity
to mediate between the individual and the tribe in ways that maintain harmony within the group,
vindicating valid individual interests by resolving them within group consensus. One set of
interests (individual) cannot exist without the other (communal). Tension tends to exist between
the individual and the community, but it is the law's task to reconcile the individual's interests
and concerns to those of the community, and vice versa, so as to maintain harmony between
them. See Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv.
175, 187 (1994); Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions and Fairness in the Navajo Nation
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol33/iss2/2
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characteristic of Navajo justice means the resolution of a given case or
controversy may be different in a Navajo court than it would be in a state
court. The Navajo system-however much it may resemble the state systems
around it-is distinctly its own.
How did the Navajo legal system achieve the vigor it enjoys at the
beginning of the twenty-first century? For most of the time since they took up
permanent residence on the Navajo Reservation in 1868, the Ding had no
viable court system, with civil cases falling by default to the state courts.2"
Federal legislation long ago placed Navajo felony criminal cases under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, with the United States Attorney's
office acting as prosecutor, beginning early in the nineteenth century.2 In
1958, about twenty-five years after its modem government began to take
shape,22 the Navajo Nation created its first tentative court system, which began
Code of Judicial Conduct, 76 JUDICATURE 15 (1992); Tso, The Tribal Court Survives, supra
note 11, at 22. Former Chief Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court Raymond D. Austin has
completed a new book that promises to be an invaluable contribution, Navajo Courts and
Navajo Common Law, scheduled for publication by the University of Minnesota Press in
November 2009.
For further study ofNavajo Fundamental Law, see NAVAJO COMMON LAW PROJECT (Navajo
Nation Council 2002), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/NCLP/commlawproj.pdf.
Curtis Heeter also has compiled an extensive collection of all references to Navajo Common
Law by the Navajo Supreme Court, organized by topic. The document, a work in progress, is
available from the author at curtisheeter@navajo.org.
20. Territorial courts provided this function until Utah was admitted to the Union in 1896,
followed by Arizona and New Mexico in 1912.
21. Criminal law is a special case. Congress has never been shy about expanding the
jurisdiction of federal courts over criminal matters involving Indians, in or out of Indian
Country. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1170 (2006). In 1825, Congress passed the forerunner of what
today is known as the Assimilative Crimes Act, making any act within United States territory
(including Indian Country) "a like offense and subject to a like punishment" in federal court
whenever the act is defined as a crime by the laws of the state within which the territory is
located. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). Finally, Indian law drastically limits tribal courts in the
criminal sentences they may impose. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006) (limiting the maximum
sentences that a tribal court may impose to a $5000 fine and one year in prison). Taken all
together, the federal statutes provide virtually unlimited federal criminal jurisdiction over events
in Indian Country, involving Indians or non-Indians, leaving only misdemeanors to the tribal
courts. Misdemeanorjurisdiction does entail an extensive criminal trial calendar in tribal court,
running into tens of thousands of cases each year. For example, in fiscal 1998 the Navajo courts
handled well over 27,000 criminal misdemeanor cases. Means v. District Court of Chinle, 7
Navajo Rptr. 382, 386 (1999).
22. The Navajo Nation has developed its governmental structure within the last half
century, beginning with the creation of a Tribal Council in 1923 to approve oil and gas leases
on the Reservation. Thereafter, when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576,48 Stat.
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to hear and decide civil lawsuits.23 With no opportunity to hear felony
criminal matters,24 the tribal courts' civil jurisdiction represented an
unexplored landscape, open to development. In 1985, after an initial period
of growth, substantial reforms confirmed the Navajo court system in its current
form and status, with a permanent Supreme Court and an increasingly active
civil calendar.25
The Conundrum of Jurisdictional Overlap
Because tribal reservations overlap the same territory as states, but have
different rather than equal status within our federal Union, tribal courts cannot
always utilize the same minimum-contacts and long-arm analyses that define
state court jurisdiction. Those standards tend to permit concurrent jurisdiction
in multiple states for civil suits based on contacts in more than one. But in the
Indian context, significant contacts may occur in only one physical location,
which is both on the reservation and in the state.
When two or more states might properly take jurisdiction of a case, where
the plaintiff chooses to file the complaint likely determines which state's court
ultimately hears and decides the lawsuit, but usually the outcome would be
substantially the same in either state.26 In general, the same rule applies when
one of the courts is a tribal court. Results in tribal and state courts tend to
approximate each other.27 Still, things are more complicated when the civil
suit arises from contacts within Indian Country, specifically the Navajo
984-88 (also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act), presented the Navajo Nation with an
opportunity to organize tribal government under a constitution, the Nation by referendum vote
rejected that possibility. The incident gave impetus to the development of modem Navajo
Nation government from that date forward. The Navajo Tribal Council became a de facto
governing body, slowly wrestling control ofNavajo internal affairs from the federal government
and steadily adding sophistication to its own structure and rules. See WmKINs, supra note 18,
at xvi-xvii, 48-54.
23. See Tso, The Tribal Court Survives, supra note 11, at 53.
24. Into the 1950s, the only "Navajo Courts" were the Courts of Indian Offenses
established in 1883 by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to apply criminal law on Indian
reservations; they were known as "CFR Courts" because they operated under the Code of
Federal Regulations. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.100-11.104 (2005).
25. In 1985, the Court ofAppeals became the Navajo Supreme Court, with three permanent
justices. Tso, The Tribal Court Survives, supra note 11, at 53.
26. One practical manifestation of this is that parties often avoid possible conflicts of law
by stipulating that the law of the local jurisdiction shall apply, thus making finding and arguing
the law eminently simpler for local attorneys and judges.
27. See Bethany Berger, Justice andthe Outsider: Jurisdiction over Non-Members in Tribal
Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005).
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Reservation, since the competing jurisdictions now include at least one state
court and one tribal court and events may arise within the territory of a single
state rather than from contacts with different state territories.
The imperatives of federal Indian law can foreclose the possibility of
concurrent jurisdiction in both the state and the tribal court; one or the other
often takes exclusive jurisdiction. Special concern for tribal
sovereignty-either inherent or defined by federal preemption of state
interests--dictates that some civil controversies must be limited to tribal
jurisdiction. Other controversies, where tribal interests fail to achieve
sufficient weight, may be foreclosed to the tribe and reserved to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state court even though they arose wholly within the
boundaries of the tribal reservation.
Between the two exclusive jurisdictions, however, there lies ample
possibility for concurrent jurisdiction. When a state court or a tribal court
finds it has exclusive jurisdiction, the other may not abide by that finding; it
might simply find that it has concurrent jurisdiction, should the occasion
present itself.28 In the extreme case, the second court might decide that it is the
one with exclusive jurisdiction, creating an awkward standoff in which both
systems claim exclusivity and purport to exercise it. Only the federal courts
can resolve the issue.
The Supreme Court of the United States has established-in a relatively
small number of opinions resolving a limited set of circumstances-the rules
and doctrines that delineate between tribal and state civil jurisdiction. In our
context here, it falls to the state and Navajo courts, in turn, to apply those rules
and doctrines to the heavier workaday traffic in civil lawsuits that find their
way onto their respective calendars. Perhaps because for so long the Navajo
Nation provided no tribal forum for the resolution of civil lawsuits, or perhaps
because the advent of a tribal alternative applying Navajo law offers the
prospect of a departure from the "American Law" that prevails throughout the
states, non-Indian civil defendants hailed into Navajo tribal court frequently
react by objecting to the court's jurisdiction. To a lesser degree, defendants
in actions filed in state courts also may respond by objecting to the court's
jurisdiction when they feel that Navajo interests are at stake.29
28. See Astorga v. Wing, 118 P.3d 1103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
29. Apparently, there are simply fewer cases filed in state court that raise the issue.
Perhaps defendants are less inclined to object to jurisdiction in state court, even when they
could do so. Perhaps it is more common for plaintiffs to be Navajos in Navajo courts, suing on
grounds that a generation before they might never have pressed against non-Indian defendants.
In any event, the combined appellate courts of the three states have generated fewer opinions
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
A body of case law has begun to emerge in the state and tribal courts
dealing with the issues that determine when the Navajo Nation's courts may
exercise their civil jurisdiction and when they may not. Interesting
discrepancies exist among the three state courts' case law. The Navajo
Supreme Court's case law adds a further dimension. While they need not
necessarily be congruent, one would hope the issue of civil jurisdiction in the
Navajo courts-while still a relatively new question of law-might have
developed to the point that some conclusions may be drawn and some
judgments made as to which among the state and tribal court judicial
precedents deserve endorsement as the better rules. °
We begin by tracing the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States,
since the case law of Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and the Navajo Nation must
be judged against that standard, to which they all are bound to adhere. As
already stated, this article concludes that the new opinion in Plains Commerce
Bank adds virtually nothing to the discussion. The Plains Commerce Bank
decision should not jeopardize any of the existing case law in the three state
courts or in the Navajo tribal courts.
The Federal Indian Law of Tribal Courts 'Jurisdiction: The Trust
Relationship, Infringement, and Preemption Analysis
Our analysis begins with the early established view--dating from the first
Non-Intercourse Acts in 179031 and carrying past the Worcester v. Georgia
decision 32 -that relations with Indian tribes exclusively belong to the federal
on civil jurisdiction than the Navajo Supreme Court.
30. Perhaps we search here for what Judge Posner would call the "Implicit Economic Logic
of the Common Law." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-55 (4th ed.
1992); see also BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 25-32,
44-50, 99-100, 178-79 (1921). When new issues come up in the law, they often generate a
stream of cases until the "best rule" begins to emerge by consensus and then achieves general
acceptance. Fewer and fewer cases raise the issue, and it eventually becomes settled law. In
sum, the common law method works to the best rule, over and over again.
31. Between 1790 and 1834, Congress passed a series of laws known as the Non-
Intercourse Acts setting the boundaries of Indian Country, prohibiting entry to non-Indians for
purposes of purchasing land or settlement, and reserving all trade with Indians to federal
regulation, among other measures consistent with Indian sovereignty. See Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). The original Act was temporary and subsequently
extended in 1793, 1796, and 1799, until succeeded by two permanent acts in 1802 and 1834.
See Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (1802); Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
32. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
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government and that states possess no unilateral authority over Indians or
Indian Country.33 Any state jurisdiction over Indian Country must be
derivative, delegated by federal dispensation, either legislative or judicial.
Congress may intervene whenever and to whatever extent it finds warranted,
mindful of the trust relationship it serves through its legislation, to set tribal
courts' jurisdiction, but state courts and legislatures have no independent
authority to affect that jurisdiction.' Likewise, the Supreme Court of the
United States may decide cases and create precedents that partition state and
tribal courts' jurisdiction within Indian Country, subject always to post hoc
preemption by Congress.3"
Until 1871, the Executive could execute treaties with tribes.36 Those
treaties, subject to ratification by the Senate,37 also could bestow a tribe with
jurisdiction and other aspects of tribal sovereignty. The Navajo Nation has
such a treaty, the Treaty of Fort Sumner, ratified in 1868 and still in force.38
The Treaty of Fort Sumner plays an important role in defining Navajo
sovereignty and the civil jurisdiction based on it.
We know that the constitutional guaranties that limit state courts' choice of
applicable law do not apply to Indian tribes.39 We further know that Indian
tribes are domestic dependent sovereigns, subject to the federal government's
trust relationship with them.'
How does an Indian tribe relate to a state of the federal union and its laws?
Criminal law falls out of the equation, due to acts of Congress,4 but that still
leaves tribal courts extensive jurisdiction over civil matters not arrogated to the
33. See supra notes 31-32.
34. Congress has since delegated such authority to the states. See White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1980) ("Long ago the Court departed from Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's view that 'that the laws of [a state] can have no force' within reservation
boundaries.") (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561).
35. E.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). The Duro case held that a tribal court did
not have criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian, but Congress reacted immediately by
passing a statute to reverse that result. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Congress repealed the President's treaty power to negotiate
treaties with Indian tribes by the Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 71). The law did not pretend to affect existing treaties, except those with tribes "in
actual hostility to the United States," whose treaties the President might abrogate by
proclamation. See 25 U.S.C. § 72.
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
38. Treaty of Fort Sumner with the Navajo Tribe, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
39. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
40. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
41. See supra note 21.
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federal government by Indian law: domestic relations, contracts, commercial
law, property, probate, execution of judgments, torts, and most of the rest of
private law normally handled by state legal systems.42 The Navajo Nation has
the legal system to handle those issues and the inclination to do so.
When a case or controversy involving private law issues arises because of
significant relationships with both a state and the Navajo Nation, which law
should apply? Put another way, when must or may state laws apply to cases
or controversies involving Navajo Nation members and Navajo Indian
Country, and vice versa?
These gateway questions establish the parameters of tribal courts' civil
jurisdiction. In the absence of direct legislation by Congress, the Indian law
propounded by the Supreme Court of the United States provides the answer,
or at least the guidelines by which the answer must be reached. In general,
federal Indian law prohibits state courts from taking jurisdiction over tribal
members and events whenever they are preempted from doing so by
congressional legislation or a treaty or whenever to do so would infringe on
Indian sovereignty. The development of the preemption and infringement
doctrines-a process begun relatively recently-is still a work in progress. It
promises to generate decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States for
the foreseeable future, with significant input from lower federal courts as well.
The growing body of state and tribal case law based on the Supreme Court
precedents lacks cohesion, as this article should demonstrate. To date, no
jurisdictional rule has emerged that would curtail parties' racing to the state or
to the tribal courthouse,43 where they think they might find more favorable
law. So far, the jurisdictional question has been treated generally as one and
the same with the question of the applicable law; tribal courts apply tribal law,
and state courts apply state law."
42. Tribes in Public Law 280 states are excepted. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (2006).
43. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 34 (1938), ended a similar disparity between state and
federal courts. Before the decision in Erie, courthouses on opposite sides of the street might
predictably reach different resolutions, applying different law (federal common law often was
different from state common law) and giving rise to races to file in one court or the other, since
the place of filing determined the outcome. This sort ofjurisdictional determinism may exist
today between state and tribal courts, and it does affect parties' conduct.
44. But see infra note 198 and accompanying text for a New Mexico case that might have
applied tribal law in state court.
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The Infringement Test
Formation of modem doctrine on tribal courts' civil jurisdiction began at
about the same time as the Navajo Nation's modem court system. The seminal
decision for defining jurisdiction over claims by non-Indians against Indians,
when the claim grows out of events on the reservation, is Williams v. Lee.45
The case involved a non-Indian merchant operating a general store on the
Navajo Indian Reservation.' The merchant followed a long-established
practice of filing suit in the Arizona state court to collect a debt for goods he
had sold to Navajo tribal members, husband and wife, who lived on the
Reservation.47 The state court entered judgment, and the Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed its jurisdiction.48 The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, casting the question as "one of state power over Indian affairs," and
stating:
[T]he basic policy of Worcester has remained .... Essentially,
absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.... Today
the Navajo [tribal courts] exercise broad criminal and civil
jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders against Indian
defendants. No Federal Act has given state courts jurisdiction over
such controversies.
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts
over Reservation affairs and hence would infiinge on the right of
the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent
is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction
with an Indian took place there. The cases in this Court have
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their
45. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The relatively late date for Williams maybe explained by the fact
that only in the mid-twentieth century, after the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and
especially with the advent of Indian self-determination in the 1960s, did tribal courts applying
tribal laws become a viable factor. There were jurisdictional decisions before Williams, but the
1959 case sets the benchmark for modem analysis of the issue.
46. Id. at 217.
47. Id. at218.
48. This sequence of events would have done no more than follow standard law and
practice in place for over a century. However, at the time Williams was decided, the Navajo
Nation had already initiated its court system, beginning in 1952.
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reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in
the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to
be taken away from them, then it is for Congress to do it.49
The "infringement test" established by Williams describes a situation in
which the parties cannot consent to state court jurisdiction; i.e., it vests subject
matter jurisdiction exclusively in the tribal court regardless of whether the
state court has personal jurisdiction over the Indian defendant. The state court
could not take the lawsuit even if the Indian defendant appeared without
contesting jurisdiction. Is the key to the Williams decision the fact that the
claim arose in Indian Country, so that the tribal court also would have
exclusive jurisdiction where the Indian was the plaintiff and the non-Indian the
defendant? The Supreme Court has since answered that question in the
negative, permitting the proper (although perhaps not exclusive) exercise of
jurisdiction over such cases by state courts, their traditional venue.50 Why a
jurisdictional distinction might turn on tribal membership, rather than
residence or significant contacts 51, may not be immediately apparent,52 but bear
with the issue and it may become clearer.
Does exclusive tribal jurisdiction under the Williams doctrine turn on the
presence of an Indian defendant? It might seem so. Indeed, consistent with
that proposition, where both parties were Indians, the Supreme Court held that
state courts could not entertain a lawsuit between two tribal members.53 On
the other hand, one can readily contemplate circumstances in which the
activities of a non-Indian defendant, or events surrounding a non-Indian
defendant, might infringe on a tribe's right to govern itself. Generally, persons
49. Id. at 219-20, 222, 223 (citations omitted).
50. Three Affiliated Tribes ofthe Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S.
138, 148 (1984). Presumably, federal courts might also exercise jurisdiction where diversity
and the requisite amount were present, but thus far no decision has established whether diversity
exists, for example, between an Arizona resident and a Navajo member resident on the
reservation in Arizona. See ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG & REBECCA TsosE,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 809-10 (4th ed. 2003).
51. For example, had the merchant in Williams been an Arizona resident who went to live
in New Mexico and set up his business there, the New Mexico courts clearly would have
jurisdiction over a civil suit naming him as the defendant.
52. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 ("It is immaterial that [plaintiff-]respondent is not an
Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there.").
53. Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976). There may be a question regarding
nonmember Indians from another tribe or reservation, however. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676, 693 (1990). The Duro case held that a tribal court did not have criminal jurisdiction over
a nonmember Indian, but Congress reversed that result by a statute that did not pertain to civil
jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
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and conduct within a sovereign's territory fall within that sovereign's
governmental authority. 4 If the merchant in Williams had set up his trading
post in-state, but outside the Reservation, he would have submitted to the
jurisdiction of that state.
Note again that Williams' infringement test cannot determine concurrent
jurisdiction; it functions only to determine exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction. If infringement occurs, the state must stand aside, even though
the case might appear to present circumstances in which concurrent
jurisdiction would exist were two states involved. Williams' rejection of all
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction renders its rule inappropriate for a case
in which an Indian plaintiff were to sue a non-Indian defendant, even if it arose
in Indian County. That set of facts might give rise to concurrent jurisdiction
in the tribal court as well as the state court." One might ponder the validity
of using the defendant's lack of tribal membership as the determining factor,
but more recent cases have increasingly turned to that factor to whittle away
at tribal courts' subject matter jurisdiction.56 The nub of Plains Commerce
Bank may lie in that reasoning,57 although the majority opinion was not willing
to make it a categorical disqualifier.
Curbing Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: Neo-Infringement
Rules that Equate Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Tribal Legislative
Jurisdiction
In 1997, after generating substantial intervening case law on other types of
tribal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court returned to the question of civil
jurisdiction in Strate v. A-i Contractors," pulling together strands from
various cases, in a way that appeared to nip at budding expansion of civil
jurisdiction for tribal courts. Plains Commerce Bank has not changed the rules
established by Strate, although it may have muddied their application. In the
54. RESTATEMENT OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 183-186 (1965).
55. Some tribal courts would hesitate to exercise such jurisdiction by their own tribal laws.
Judge Canby notes that "a number of tribal codes provide for civil jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants only when they stipulate to it." CANBY, supra note 11, at 189. But the fact that they
could exercise such jurisdiction upon a defendant's consent indicates that the subject matter is
appropriate to the tribal court.
56. Indeed, the first words of Paul A. Banker, the attorney for Plains Commerce Bank, at
oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States were, "Tribes lack inherent
sovereign power over nonmembers." Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Plains Commerce Bank
v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008) (No. 07-411).
57. See Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715.
58. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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more recent decision, no member of the Supreme Court disavowed Strate in
any way; the Court split 5-4 over whether its first (of two) tribal-jurisdiction-
granting exceptions applied in a specific set of circumstances.
Strate involved an automobile accident between non-Indians 9 on a state
highway through a reservation. When the plaintiff filed in tribal court, the
defendants made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction and lost before
the trial court and on appeal. Without waiting to litigate the merits, the
defendants then commenced an action in federal district court, again attacking
the tribal court's jurisdiction. The question made its way to the Supreme Court
on certiorari, and the United States' highest tribunal held that tribal courts had
no jurisdiction over a dispute between nonmembers growing out of events on
a right-of-way (lands ceded to the state for a highway) through the
reservation.60
Strate walks an interesting line. It relied on Montana v. United States,6' a
case the Supreme Court had decided sixteen years earlier and which dealt with
a tribe's legislative jurisdiction. Strate found in Montana an analysis of
"forms of [tribes'] civil jurisdiction" that applied to judicial power over civil
matters and held that a tribe's "adjudicative jurisdiction" could not surpass its
legislative jurisdiction. The Court stated:
While Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the
Court broadly addressed the concept of "inherent sovereignty."
[M]ontana delineated-in a main rule and exceptions-the bounds
of the power tribes retain to exercise "forms of civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians." As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.
Absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction,
we adhere to that understanding.... [T]he civil authority of Indian
tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands
generally "do[es] not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe." 6
2
59. Id. at 443. The Court actually characterized the parties as "nonmembers," apparently
making the decision valid as to cases including Indians of a tribe different than the tribal court.
See id.
60. See id. at 459 (creating a special category of Indian Country less subject to Indian
jurisdiction). Compare with 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
61. 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (6-3 vote). In the sixteen years between Montana and Strate, the
makeup of the Supreme Court changed greatly. Of the nine judges who decided Montana, only
two-Rehnquist and Stevens-were still on the Court when it decided Strate.
62. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (citations omitted).
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Finally, the Strate opinion recognized the "continued viability" of Williams
v. Lee's infringement test, but saw "[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory
authority over the state highway accident [as] needed to preserve 'the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. "63 Perhaps
it should not have surprised anyone that the Williams infringement
test-drawn to define subject matter jurisdiction exclusive to tribal
courts-might not deprive state courts of the power to hear a dispute between
non-Indians arising on fee (non-Indian) land. The language of the decision in
Strate probably ended any lingering doubt that the sole determining factor for
infringement would be the site of the event on the reservation. The Supreme
Court's concern fixed on the status of the parties. Justice Ginsburg wrote for
the unanimous Strate Court, "As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."
The Infringement Test Restated for Legislative Jurisdiction
The Strate decision found its touchstone for measuring tribal courts' civil
jurisdiction in the case of Montana v. United States, which had defined the
boundaries of a tribe's power to legislate.65 The Crow Tribe of Montana
prohibited hunting and fishing by nonmembers on reservation lands, but
Montana asserted its authority to regulate fishing by non-Indians on the Big
Horn River. While the river flowed through the reservation, its riverbed had
passed into state ownership when Montana entered the Union.' The Supreme
Court held that the Crow Tribe had no authority to regulate hunting and fishing
by non-Indians on land owned by non-Indians, even though that land was
within the reservation.67
The Montana court restated the proper measure of the tribal interest that
might be infringed: "exercise of tribal power beyond that which is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation." ' There is an echo of Williams in Montana, but the
63. Id. at 459 (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220).
64. Id. at 453.
65. 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (6-3 vote).
66. Id. at 556-57. This holding ignored the canons of construction, which normally would
have construed all treaties liberally in favor of the tribe and generally would have read treaties
as grants from, rather than to, the tribe. Justice Blackmun, joined by two others, pointed this
out in his dissent. See id. at 569 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
67. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556-57.
68. Id. at 564 (1981), quoted in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) and Strate v.
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later opinion expressed the field of a tribe's exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction for legislative purposes more specifically and more narrowly.
The Montana court-with Justice Stewart writing for the majority-began
by stating a sweeping proposition: "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers."69 That proposition
clashed with the general rule of vestigial sovereignty that, absent a treaty or
statute to the contrary, a tribe has authority over its territory. Taking that
consideration into account, the Montana decision recognized two exceptions
that would allow a tribe to regulate nonmembers' activities: 1) where the
nonmembers had entered into "consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members," or 2) "the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [a]
reservation.., threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."7 °
Thus, Montana set out a rule: activities of nonmembers are not subject to
tribal regulation.71 Then Montana set out two exceptions to its rule. The two
exceptions borrowed (though not overtly) the criteria from Williams,
expressing them descriptively in the first exception and doctrinally in the
second. The first exception describes the fact situation in Williams. The
second exception provides a doctrine by which to measure whether certain
A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446, 456-59 (1997).
69. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
70. Id. at 565-66.
71. The Montana rule might be seen, in its own right, as an exception to the broader
traditional rule that tribes have authority to regulate activity within their territory, i.e., within
Indian Country. By 1997, however, the Supreme Court stated in Strate v. A-] Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 450 (1997), "Montana thus described a general rule that, absent different
congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of non-members on
non-Indian land within a reservation .... " The Supreme Court expressed a concern that the
exceptions to the "Montana rule" should not be applied in a way that "would severely shrink"
it. See id. at 458. With that formulation, Montana should best be seen as a new rule, replacing
the old rule in favor of general tribal authority over their territory. But see Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.... Civil jurisdiction over such
activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by specific treaty
provisions or federal statute."). Judge Canby notes,
Although Montana announced an exception to the general rule that a tribe has
governmental power over its territory unless some statute or treaty takes it away,
subsequent Supreme Court opinions have tended to refer to the "Montana rule,"
not the "Montana exception." As a "rule" limiting inherent tribal sovereignty, it
continues to gain strength; indeed, it appears to have become the foundation case
for contemporary Indian law in the Supreme Court.
CANBY, supra note 11, at 78.
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conduct by a nonmember reaches a level of impact on the tribe that justifies
tribal regulation. Under the Montana doctrinal exception, it is hard to
conceive of a situation in which any common transaction between two
nonmembers might engage "the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe."72
The Montana Court confronted a fact situation that made its rejection of the
first exception, for a consensual relationship, relatively easy. The Court then
turned to the second exception and summarily found that hunting and fishing
by nonmembers bore "no clear relationship to tribal self-government or
internal relations" and therefore retained inherent sovereignty did not authorize
the Crow Tribe to exercise authority over that activity.73
Despite Mr. Justice Stewart's sweeping statement, which might be read to
deny tribes all regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers wherever they were,
the facts of Montana-nonmembers' conduct on non-Indian fee lands
(specifically, the state's river running through the reservation)--left open the
possibility that where nonmembers' conduct occurred in Indian Country
(whether Indian or non-Indian land), and engendered significant contacts with
a tribe, that tribe might still enjoy general sovereignty over such activities. In
2001, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley74 at least restricted that possibility,
making it clear that it would not be an easy loophole.
In Atkinson, the Supreme Court denied the Navajo Nation the right to tax
non-Indians for hotel occupancy within the reservation. Although the hotel
occupied an island of non-Indian land, it relied on tribal services and security
and employed almost 100 tribal members. In the eyes of the Atkinson Court,
Montana's sweeping statement had an application as broad as its language, at
least for regulatory authority, and neither of its exceptions were present. The
Supreme Court seemed to require a clear and heightened "threa[t] or... direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe," even in the event of a consensual relationship with the tribe or its
members, before it would find an exception creating tribal jurisdiction.7" Still,
Atkinson did not extend Montana to Indian lands proper.
72. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989) (permitting (by 5-4 vote) tribal zoning of nonmember fee lands in a portion of the
reservation closed to the public, thus permitting regulation of nonmember activities).
In Brendale, Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent that Montana had created a relatively
narrow exception to the general authority of tribes' power to govern. See id. at 450-53.
However, no Supreme Court justice has made that argument since.
73. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65.
74. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
75. Id. at 657 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
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After Montana and Atkinson, the possibility of a tribe invoking the Montana
infringement exceptions to exercise legislative jurisdiction over a nonmember
involved in conduct on non-Indian fee land seems quite remote. And, since
Strate makes tribal judicial jurisdiction over civil controversies the same as
legislative jurisdiction, tribal courts might contemplate greatly restricted civil
jurisdiction growing out of nonmembers' conduct on non-tribal lands, even
when those non-tribal lands lay wholly within the reservation and even when
tribal members are involved.
In fact, the majority in Plains Commerce Bank found that exactly those
circumstances-a transaction between nonmembers involving non-tribal lands
within the reservation-existed in that case. It does appear that the majority
ignores significant involvement of tribal members, or at least finds that any
such involvement was irrelevant without saying so.
Has Plains Commerce Bank Instigated a Limited Per Se Rule with Virtually
No Precedential Value?
If Strate, Montana, and Atkinson left doubts as to how far the Supreme
Court might have left the door open for tribal jurisdiction over nonmember
conduct on non-tribal lands, Plains Commerce Bank76 seems to have labored
mightily and identified one limited situation in which tribal courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction, at least in the minds of five of the nine justices then
sitting on the Supreme Court of the United States. Specifically, under the new
case, when a nonmember sells fee land to a nonmember, then any possibility
that the sale may have discriminated against a tribal member escapes the
competence of the tribal court."
Plains Commerce Bank involved troubled Indian debtors attempting
through workouts with the lender bank to salvage a ranching operation, the
Long Family Land & Cattle Company, on 2230 acres of fee land within the
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in South Dakota.
Beginning in 1988, the Company and the owners of the land, Kenneth and
Maxine Long, and subsequently their son Ronnie and his wife, Lila, became
debtors of the bank."8 Incorporated in South Dakota, the Company's articles
76. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
77. Id. at 2714.
78. See Id. at 2714-16. Plains Commerce Bank is successor to the Bank of Hoven, which
initiated the loans to the Longs in 1988. The town of Hoven, South Dakota, lies about twenty-
five miles from the reservation. While the loans were to the Company, the bank required
personal guaranties from Kenneth, Maxine, Ronnie, and Lila Long, including a mortgage on
their 2230 acres of land and security interests in their personal property including hay, cattle,
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of incorporation required that "at least 51% of [its] outstanding shares must be
Indian owned at all times, ensuring the company's eligibility for Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) loan guarantees."79 Maxine, a tribal member, took 51%
of the shares and Kenneth, a nonmember, 49%. When Maxine died, Ronnie
and Lila, both tribal members, inherited her 51%. Kenneth's will provided
that his interests in the land and the Company were to go to his four children,
all tribal members.8"
The ranching operation had debts. When Kenneth died in 1995, he owed
the bank over $750,000, more than the value of his estate. Negotiations
ensued in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's offices, with direct participation
by "tribal officers and BIA employees." 8' The parties agreed to a workout deal
by which the estate would deed the 2230 acres, and Kenneth's off-reservation
house, to the bank in lieu of foreclosure, reducing the debt by $478,000. In
return, the bank initially offered to sell the land back to the Longs for the same
amount under a twenty-year "contract for deed, ' 82 while at the same time
extending operating loans to the Company. However, the bank changed its
mind and withdrew the offer by a letter "citing 'possible jurisdictional
problems' posed by the Long Company's status as an 'Indian owned entity on
the reservation.' '"83 In December 1996, the Longs-with little bargaining
power-signed a two-year lease with an option to purchase for $478,000 and
an agreement for attendant operating loans to be guarantied by the BIA.
The Longs' bad luck continued when the "horrific winter of 1996-1997"
ensued.' While the winter raged, for two months the BIA did not respond to
the bank's initial applications for guaranties on the operating loans.85 The BIA
finally requested that the bank redraft the applications and submit them again.
The bank then chose not to pursue the BIA guaranties further and did not make
machinery, and their shares in the Company. See id.
The BIA also guarantied the loans and ultimately paid the bank "almost $400,000, more
than 80% of the net losses resulting from its loans to the Longs." Id. at 2729 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1078 (D.S.D. 2006)).
79. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878,881 (8th Cir.
2007).
80. Apparently Ronnie Long's three siblings assigned him their interest in their father's
estate. Id. at 881 n.2.
81. Id.
82. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715.
83. Plains Commerce Bank, 491 F.3d at 882.
84. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., No. R-120-99, at 3
(Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2004).
85. See Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
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the operating loans to the Company,86 which in the interim lost all of its
cattle--over 500 head-to blizzards. 7 The Longs claimed the bank's failure
to provide operating loans sealed their loss of the land. 8
Although they could not meet their obligations, the Longs refused to vacate
the land when their lease expired in 1998. In early 1999, the bank began
eviction proceedings in state court and tribal court,89 after first selling a 320-
acre parcel of the land to a non-Indian couple. Subsequently, after the Longs
received the eviction notices, the bank sold the remaining 1910 acres, again to
a non-Indian couple.
The Longs" responded with a multi-claim suit in tribal court alleging
among other things the bank's breach of the loan agreement and other
contracts, its bad faith in its dealings with the Longs, and its discrimination
against the Longs when it gave more favorable terms to non-Indian buyers, of
what had been the Longs' land. After a two-day trial in December 2002, the
jury returned a general verdict for the Longs on the three claims and awarded
them $750,000 plus $123,131 in prejudgment interest and an option to
purchase 960 acres under title to the bank for $201,600."'
The bank appealed to the tribal Court of Appeals, raising-somewhat
incredibly-only the issue of tribal jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. 92
86. Id.
87. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715.
88. Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
89. Although it ultimately served the Longs with a notice to quit through the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Court. See Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715; id. at 2729
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
90. There is some confusion as to precisely who the plaintiffs in the case were and on what
claims. The contract claims pertained to the Long Family Land & Cattle Co., but individual
plaintiffs brought the discrimination claim.
91. See Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715-16; Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F.
Supp. 2d at 1075.
92. The limited basis for the bank's objection to jurisdiction is hard to track through the
various levels and opinions. Could the Longs still claim theirjudgment for $880,000, based on
the bank's bad faith and breach of contract? None of the opinions confronts and clarifies this
point. The four opinions prior to the Supreme Court of the United States did not have to since
they affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court states that the appellant bank seeks a ruling
that the tribal judgment is "null and void because, as relevant here, the Tribal Court lacked
jurisdiction over the Long's discrimination claim." Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2716.
The Longs raise this argument as one against the bank's standing, but the majority says that "the
jury could have based its damages award, in whole or in part, on the finding of discrimination."
Id. at 2717. The majority finally states that "the ultimate collateral consequence of such a
determination, whatever it may be.... does not alter the fact that the Bank has shown injury
traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling." Id. at 2717-
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It lost before the tribal Court of Appeals and then before the U.S. District
Court for the District of South Dakota and before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.
Mr. Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the five-member majority begins,
This case concerns the sale of fee land on a tribal reservation by
a non-Indian bank to non-Indian individuals. Following the sale,
an Indian couple, customers of the bank who had defaulted on their
loans, claimed the bank discriminated against them by offering the
land to non-Indians on terms more favorable than those the bank
offered to them.93
To thus characterize the case, is to decide against tribal jurisdiction at the
outset. It casts the case ineluctably into Strate's most basic formulation,
"[T]he civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts with respect to non-
Indian fee lands generally 'do[es] not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe.""'
Of course, Plains Commerce Bank's facts would seem to compel a more
accurate formulation of the case as one which involved Indian-owned fee land
mortgaged by its Indian owners to a non-Indian bank, which of its own
volition, had remained continuously involved with those tribal-member
owners, their tribe, and the BIA on their reservation. The bank's conduct at
issue before the Cheyenne River Sioux trial court in Plains Commerce Bank
occurred toward the end of its longstanding commercial relationship with
certain tribal members, the Longs. The bank had come onto the reservation to
work out agreements, mediated by tribal and BIA officials, with the Longs
when the debts secured by the Longs' fee land placed their continued
ownership of that fee land in peril. Finally, the bank had sought procedures
before the tribal court to evict the debtors from their land after they had
defaulted.
Does the singular fact of status, as fee lands trafficked at some point
between a non-Indian bank and non-Indian buyers, somehow scrape off all
possibility of tribal jurisdiction over that particular transaction, regardless of
whatever prior relationship existed between the bank, tribal members, and the
land? Plains Commerce Bank can support no such sweeping rule; it treats only
jurisdiction over the issue of discrimination in such a sale and might seem to
18.
93. Id. at 2714.
94. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
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leave other matters-specifically, bad faith and breach of contract-properly
before the tribal court. That would preserve the essence of Strate-Montana's
first exception, that consensual relationships with Indians submit the party
entering into them to the jurisdiction of tribal courts.
The four dissenters would not even deny tribal jurisdiction over the
discrimination issue. Justice Ginsburg-also author of the unanimous Strate
decision eleven years before-begins the dissent with a categorical rejection
of Justice Roberts' characterization of the case. She instead embraces the
Eighth Circuit's view that it is a case "[a]bout the power of the Tribe to hold
nonmembers like the bank to a minimum standard of fairness when they
voluntarily deal with tribal members." '95 Not surprisingly, the broader
characterization led her to conclude, "In my view, this is a clear case for
application of Montana's first or 'consensual relationships' exception."96 The
dissent goes on to argue that precisely the kind of bank conduct at issue here
supports the consensual-relationships exception, noting that Montana itself
listed "commercial dealing, contracts and leases" as the sort of activities that
it contemplated tribes properly regulating.97
The Facts and Single Issue on Appeal Make Plains Commerce Bank a Very
Narrow Holding, ofLittle Precedential Value
One must read Plains Commerce Bank as a child of its peculiar pleading.
The appellant bank attacked the tribal jurisdiction over only the discrimination
claim, although the jury found for the plaintiffs on their claims of bad faith,
breach of contract, and discrimination and awarded a "general verdict" for
$750,000. This curious self-limitation98 by the successful appellant leaves
open not only the question of precisely what it has won, if anything, but what
precedent its case may have set. If the Supreme Court of the United States'
proper role is to create law rather than decide individual cases, and it should
use certiorari judiciously for that purpose, then Plains Commerce Bank is a
bad day's work.
95. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2727 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878, 887 (8th Cir. 2007)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
98. In a similarly strange oversight, or odd strategic decision, the appellees did not plead
the Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux Nation, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 (ratified Feb. 16,
1869). Both the federal district court and the Eighth Circuit took note of the omission. See
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076 n.2
(D.S.D. 2006); Plains Commerce Bank, 491 F.3d at 885 n.5.
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The bare majority may have granted certiorari in the expectation that it
could use the Plains Commerce Bank as an agenda case to derogate or
emasculate the first exception in Montana. The facts might have supported a
ruling denying a tribal court all possible jurisdiction over the legal
consequences of a non-Indian bank's continued consensual commercial
relationship with its erstwhile Indian debtors.
But for whatever reason, the five justices missed the opportunity. The
majority could have agreed with the four dissenters (and all of the lower court
judges that considered the case) that the discrimination claim grew out of a
consensual relationship. Then the majority could have ruled that even where
the facts qualified the case for Montana's first exception, no tribal court
jurisdiction obtained, either derogating the exception altogether or
emasculating it by identifying mitigating factors that made it inapplicable in
the case. Such a decision could have left tribal courts with virtually no civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers, regardless of their consensual relationships
with tribes and tribal members.
It could have taken us back to Justice Stewart's statement in Montana that
"the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities
of nonmembers"9 9 and stripped away the major exception to that rule. Perhaps
the bare majority could not muster all of its five votes to that extreme, or it
lacked resolve when the time came to write the opinion, feeling that the Plains
Commerce Bank case did not provide a suitable vehicle for such a sweeping
change.
Note carefully what the majority backed away from in Plains Commerce
Bank. As the majority stated the case, however much it may have twisted the
facts to do so, Plains Commerce Bank deals with a transaction between two
nonmembers, the same as in Strate. That formulation does not confront the
first Montana exception, it avoids it. To truly confront the first exception, the
Supreme Court-or at least a majority of the Supreme Court-must first
identify a case whose facts deal with only one nonmember who has created a
consensual relationship with tribal members in Indian Country. Plains
Commerce Bank had such facts, if the majority had only recognized them.
Given such a case, then the bare majority-if it has the will to do so-would
have the occasion to overrule the first exception. °0
As it stands, Plains Commerce Bank represents no disagreement over the
Strate-Montana doctrine. The two exceptions continue untouched. The five-
justice majority excluded the first Montana exception by finding that the case
99. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
100. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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involved a sale of fee land between nonmembers. Fourjustices thought it was
more and saw facts that would have triggered the first exception.' 0'
Lower courts should apply the Strate-Montana doctrine as before, mindful
that the Supreme Court of the United States has passed on a chance to overrule
that doctrine. Our highest court has defined a sale of non-tribal land between
nonmembers as insufficient to give rise to a member's discrimination claim.
By definition, no claim of discrimination against tribal members can arise from
those facts. Consequently, no tribal court hereafter should exercise civil
jurisdiction over that singular factual situation.
The Plains Commerce Bank decision, however, does not appear to foreclose
the propriety of tribal jurisdiction based on the implications-including bad
faith and breach of contract--of such a sale in the context of related
circumstances involving tribal members.'0 2 Indeed, the tribal court granted
judgment on those causes of action, 3 and the judgment debtor neglected to
appeal that exercise of jurisdiction."° It remains quite likely that the Long
family will have its judgment against the bank-now over a million dollars in
principal and interest-and wind up back on its land, when the trial court
considers the issues on remand."5
The Supreme Court reversed, by narrowing the consensual relationship out
of the facts, by the narrowest of margins. 6
101. All lower courts (totaling eight judges, with no dissents) found jurisdiction in the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court because of the first exception in Montana: nonmembers'
consensual relationship with the tribe or its members. See Plains Commerce Bank, 491 F.3d
at 881; Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Plains Commerce Bank v. Long
Family Land & Cattle Co., No. R-120-99 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Ct. App. Nov. 30,
2004).
102. See Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715-16.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2725.
105. The Supreme Court shied away from any indication that its holding would upset the
Longs' judgement against the bank. While it muddles through to a reference that hints that the
appellant bank might gain relief from the judgment in tribal court, the bare majority's
disposition of the issue is anything but dispositive. See id. at 2725 n.2. At oral argument, the
Court seemed equally unable to pin down the ultimate consequences of its reversal and remand,
as it might generally effect the Longs' judgment against the bank. See generally Transcript of
Oral Argument at 18-21, 26-32, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128
S. Ct. 2709 (2008) (No. 07-411).
106. Both Montana and Strate were unanimous decisions. See generally Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Since then, it
appears nine justices have never agreed on a case involving the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts.
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The Strate-Montana parlay, essentially unaffected by Plains Commerce
Bank, leaves some promising possibilities still open to tribes interested in
exercising civil jurisdiction. First, Montana's subjective exceptions provide
viable bases for tribal courts' civil jurisdiction; exceptions which appear to
echo in concept the Williams v. Lee infringement test. Courts below the
Supreme Court have shown themselves willing to find circumstances that fit
the exceptions. Second, Williams' statement of the infringement test contained
the seed of another doctrine, when it said, apropos of "the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations[,] Congress recognized this authority in
the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power
is to be taken away, it is for Congress to do it."' 7 In other words, Williams
recognized that Congress might preempt limitations on a tribe's civil
jurisdiction by granting the tribe broaderjurisdictional powers. No subsequent
case or congressional act has diminished that possibility, to which we now
turn.
The Preemption Doctrine
Preemption begins from the proposition that Congress may intervene to
define tribal jurisdiction however it wishes; the power is plenary. It is at this
juncture, perhaps, that the nature of the trust relationship between federal
government and tribe becomes most obvious. The res of the trust figuratively
settled on the federal govemment is tribal sovereignty itself.' In addition, it
must be thought of as an equitable or constructive trust-growing out of
circumstance, neither willingly nor intentionally rendered up by the
tribes 9- imposed by doctrine worked out in the chambers of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and exercised by the Congress with the aid of the
Executive.
The trust doctrine may leave open the question of how much inherent tribal
sovereignty remains. Even if there be some portion neither given up nor
expropriated to the federal government, enough is gone that it becomes simpler
to just presume that there is no inherent sovereignty and come at the equation
from the other side. One asks not whether the tribe retained sovereignty, but
107. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
108. This reference probably is best taken in a figurative sense because a res normally
requires a type of property, existing and assignable. See ROBERT L. MENNELL, WILLS AND
TRUSTS INA NUTSHELL 195-96 (2d ed. 1994).
109. Again, the analogy is not perfect, since the constructive trust normally requires the
trustee to transfer specific property to the beneficiary, rather than to administer it over time. See
DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES §§ 4.3, 10.2, 10.3 (1993).
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whether Congress has given it back. The United States Congress may clearly
define how much sovereignty the tribes---or a given tribe-may use and how
they may use it. Until 1871, Congress did so by ratifying the treaties the
Executive negotiated with tribes that defined tribal sovereignty.
The case that most cleanly exposes the nature of the trust relationship in the
context of the preemption doctrine may be McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission," in an opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall.
In McClanahan, the analysis moved away from-but did not completely
abandon-inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction over
Indians and Indian Country. In that case the Supreme Court of the United
States read the applicable treaties and statutes with the "tradition of
sovereignty in mind" to decide that the State of Arizona was preempted from
taxing the income earned by an Indian on the reservation."' In the process, the
Supreme Court defined a new perspective on the nature of domestic dependent
sovereignty.
McClanahan held that virtually all of the tribes' sovereignty had been
delivered up in trust to the federal government implicitly by the events of the
nineteenth century. McClanahan shifted the focus to the concept of federal
preemption, turning to treaties and statutes to determine areas foreclosed to
state exercise." 2 In Judge Canby's phrase,
By reducing sovereignty to a backdrop and relying on the
preemptive effect of federal law to exclude state power,
McClanahan's analysis appears to alter the presumption that the
tribe has governmental power over all matters affecting the tribe on
the reservation, and that the state does not. It seems instead to
assume that the state has power unless federal law (including
federal Indian policy) has preempted it." 3
In effect, preemption analysis places tribal sovereignty into a federal
preserve, for which treaties or congressional laws set rules protecting the
tribes' domestic sovereignty and thereby preempt the states' jurisdiction." 4
110. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
111. Id. at 173.
112. Id. at 172.
113. CANBY, supra note 11, at 89.
114. The Navajo Supreme Court does not see treaties in this light, however. See Means v.
District Court ofChinle, 7 Navajo Rptr. 382 (1999), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/
cases/navajo/means.htm. The Means opinion states, "A treaty is not a grant of rights to Indian
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That analysis avoids reference to inherent sovereignty as the basis for tribal
jurisdiction, although it does not abolish the reference. Identifying what
activities are preempted based on treaties and statutes that define tribal
sovereignty often becomes an exercise in long-after-the-fact adaptation.
The Navajo Treaty of Fort Sumner of 1868 set apart a reservation for the
use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians,115 thereby retaining civil
jurisdiction by inherent sovereignty." 6 In contemplation of such treaties, the
acts by which states were admitted to the Union typically contained provisions
by which the new states disclaimed all right and title to jurisdiction over land
and property held by Indians."' Such laws provide a durable "inherent"
sovereignty that persists in the face of case law that would otherwise curtail
it 118it. "
Perhaps the preemption doctrine had always been there, latent in the nature
of the trust relationship. Where Worcester might have implied that the tribes
retained sovereignty that had never passed from them, unless and until a treaty
or a law of Congress took it from them, McClanahan seems to embrace the
idea that virtually all tribal sovereignty passed to the federal government for
its fiduciary administration. Any inherent sovereignty is of residual character,
a tradition to be born in mind. Meanwhile, the federal trustee may preempt
state interest by permitting the tribal beneficiary to take possession of all or
portions of the trust sovereignty. The federal fiduciary also, however, may
permit the states to exercise all or portions of the tribal sovereignty held in
federal trust. The proper exercise of tribal and state jurisdiction then turns on
determining the preemptive effect of the federal laws and treaties.
A federal grant of tribal sovereignty preempts state jurisdiction. No state
may violate that preemption by "interfer[ing] with or [acting] incompatibl[y]
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.""1 9
That formulation of the preemption doctrine seems to admit the possibility that
state interests might overcome apparent preemption when the state interest
attains sufficient weight to overcome a tradition of tribal sovereignty, be that
inherent or by federal grant. Or perhaps it admits the possibility that a state's
115. Treaty of Fort Sumner with the Navajo Tribe, supra note 38, at art. 2.
116. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-23 (1959).
117. See Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910); ARIz. CONST. art. 20; N.M.
CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
118. E.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195-97 (1978); Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 684 (1990).
119. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
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interest may ascend to such elevated importance that it must override tribal
sovereignty, else it be preempted even when Indian sovereignty is not overtly
expressed, simply because the fiduciary administration favors the beneficiary's
use, always bearing in mind the tradition of sovereignty.120 This formulation
departs a bit from that of Judge Canby quoted above, shading its assumption
away from the states and in favor of the tribes. Let us test it against the rest of
the body of law defining tribal jurisdiction and when a state may act.
At the end of the day, laws and treaties provide a rich trove of Indian
sovereignty-be it residual inherent sovereignty or sovereignty created anew
by federal grant-that persists under the preemption doctrine.' 2' The
infringement doctrine preserves that sovereignty from incursion by state courts
or legislatures. Preemption defines sovereignty; freedom from infringement
preserves it. There may be deeper, more venerable sources of Indian
sovereignty, inherent in the history and status of the tribes, but at the end of the
day it does not matter. Federal Indian policy today supports tribal autonomy,
having laid a sturdy preemptive basis for such autonomy in nineteenth century
treaties and a more recent series of late twentieth century laws. Preemptive
sovereignty provides a sufficient base, even if there were no other, for tribal
courts' civil jurisdiction. Paired with the infringement doctrine as developed
to this point in time, preemption establishes ample-if not
unlimited-opportunity to vindicate tribal court jurisdiction in the face of a
state court's claim.
The Exhaustion Requirement: Tribal Courts' First Crack at Determining
Their Own Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court gave tribal courts succor in 1985, in National Farmers
Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, 22 which dealt with the question of a Crow
Tribe court's jurisdiction over a case involving members and activities at a
school on the Crow reservation run by the state school district, giving rise to
a claim for indemnity against an out-of-state insurer. The insurer and the
school district-which somehow did not find out about the case until after the
tribal court had entered a judgment2 2 and plaintiffs had begun execution
against school property-resisted by filing a lawsuit before the federal district
120. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
121. E.g., Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195-97; Duro, 495 U.S. at 684.
122. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
123. Id. at 847-48. The plaintiffs served the complaint and summons on the chairman of the
school board, but he neglected to notify either the school board or the insurer. See id.
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court based on "federal question"jurisdiction, 1 4 seeking to enjoin enforcement
for lack of jurisdiction in the tribal court. They argued that an earlier case,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, holding that tribal courts "did not have
criminal jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians for offenses committed on
the reservation," applied to cutoff tribal jurisdiction over civil actions as
well.'25 The Supreme Court found a federal question, but concluded,
[T]he answer to the question whether a tribal court has the power
to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians in a
case of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as an extension of
Oliphant would require. Rather, the existence and extent of a tribal
court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal
sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered,
divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant
statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and
elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.
We believe that examination should be conducted in the first
instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often recognized
that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-
government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that
will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the
first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the
challenge.2 6
In other words, the National Farmers court identified a situation in which
the tribal court might properly exercise adjudicative jurisdiction, not
necessarily exclusive to the tribe, but conceivably appropriate to the tribe. The
Supreme Court wanted the tribal court to take the first look at its own civil
jurisdiction before any federal court did.
Two years later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,'27 the Supreme
Court dealt with a similar question when Blackfoot members and activities on
the Blackfoot reservation gave rise to a claim for indemnity against an out-of-
state insurer. The insurer resisted, this time invoking federal diversity
jurisdiction as a bar to any obligation it might have had to defend and
indemnify the defendants named in the tribal court lawsuit. The Supreme
Court's opinion noted that
124. See28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
125. Nat 7 Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 853; see also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
126. Nat 7 Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 855-56.
127. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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[t]ribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government ... and the
Federal Government has consistently encouraged their
development.... Tribal authority over activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or
federal statute.' [T]he federal policy supporting tribal self-
government directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give
the tribal court a 'full opportunity to determine its own
jurisdiction."29
The rule requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies set out in National Farmers
and Iowa Mutual departs from normal practice in jurisdictional matters in state
courts, which could either bind a defendant to a determination of jurisdiction
where s/he made an appearance in the lawsuit 3 ° or permit a defendant to
choose not to appear, suffer a default judgment, and then attack the
jurisdictional question-but not the merits-in a different court. 3 ' Note
carefully, however, that the question of tribal courts' civil jurisdiction does not
derive from the usual situation in a civil suit, since the court with ultimate
responsibility for resolving the jurisdictional question (the federal court) is not
the court that might hear the merits (state or tribal), unless there is diversity
jurisdiction. The federal question jurisdiction to determine tribal jurisdiction
never depends on diversity.
The language of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual seems to reject the
categorical statements of Montana and Oliphant and create special
consideration for tribal courts' civil jurisdiction. Particularly, for example,
Iowa Mutual's statement that "tribal authority over activities of non-Indians
on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty, [with] [c]ivil
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively [lying] in the tribal courts"'32
128. Id. at 14-15, 18 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 16. However, the tribal court's full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction
is ultimately subject to review in federal district court. Id. at 19.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFUCTS § § 24,81 (1971). A defendant might make
a special appearance, as provided for in section 81, solely for the purpose of contesting
jurisdiction. If defendant wins on that question, he or she may then leave without having
consented to jurisdiction over the merits; but if defendant loses, he or she is then subject to
jurisdiction over the merits. See id.
131. See id. §§ 24, 110. Parallel proceedings need not dictate that one should cease. The
first judgment in time should prevail. See id. § 86.
132. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
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seems to reject or at least confront Montana's earlier statement that "the
inherent sovereign [legislative] powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers."' 33 If the exhaustion-requirement cases apparently
encouraged broader possibilities for tribal civil jurisdiction for a time, Strate,
however, may have nipped those possibilities in the bud by reading the Iowa
Mutual language as simply a reiteration of the Montana exceptions.'34
After the Strate decision (1997) and the categorical holdings in Montana
(1986) and Atkinson (2001), the exhaustion requirement does not hand over as
much jurisdictional discretion as might have appeared at the time National
Farmers (1985) and Iowa Mutual (1987) were first decided. The exhaustion
requirement never rested easy in the system, however. The Iowa Mutual
decision contains a footnote that clearly states that the requirement "did not
deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. Exhaustion is
required as a matter of comity, not as ajurisdictional prerequisite.' 35 In other
words, after the tribal court has made its ruling on jurisdiction, a party may
still dispute that ruling in federal court. Parties have done so, frequently and
successfully,136 more so after Strate discarded any possibility that National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual might have moved away from applying Montana's
limitations on legislative jurisdiction to the recognition of tribal courts' civil
adjudicative jurisdiction.
The exhaustion requirement does have an effect, however. It gives tribal
courts an initial strike in defining and asserting their own jurisdiction and puts
pressure on those who must undertake the time and cost to resist it whenever
it is asserted. Proceedings in the tribal court should create a record supporting
any finding of jurisdiction. When that record goes to the federal court for
review, that review should presumably begin in a light favorable to
affirmation, even as it considers the question de novo. The United States
133. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
134. See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 451-53 (1997) ("In keeping with the
precedent to which Iowa Mutual refers, the statement stands for nothing more than the
unremarkable proposition that, where tribes possess authority to regulate activities of non-
members, civil jurisdiction over disputes arising out of such activities presumptively lies in the
tribal courts."). This, of course, construes the Iowa Mutual statement as a mere tautology, that
tribal courts presumptively have jurisdiction whenever they have jurisdiction.
135. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16 n.8; see Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir.
1997); see also Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (characterizing exhaustion as a "prudential rule").
136. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE,supra note 50, at 810-15. Unlike the constitutional
obligation between the states to render full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister state,
comity permits review ofa prior holding-including jurisdiction-to make sure that it comports
with the standards of the receiving court.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an important circuit encompassing
many Indian tribes, construes the exhaustion requirement in diversity cases
brought in federal district court to force the plaintiff to withdraw and file in
tribal court, even though he or she initially chose not to do so.'37
There exists enough ambiguity in the system still-with Montana's
exceptions and McClanahan's preemption doctrine laid over Williams'
infringement test-that an imaginative and insightful tribal court frequently
may find good bases for its assertion of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Given contacts with the reservation and its member Indians, the circumstances
of any civil suit open themselves to the "careful examination of tribal
sovereignty ... as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes ... treaties...
and administrative or judicial decisions"1 38 commended by National Farmers
and to the possibility that a tribal court may determine that it has the power to
proceed to judgment.
The clear cases for and against jurisdiction out of the Supreme Court of the
United States are relatively few, leaving a significant spectrum in which to
assert a tribal court's power, if a tribal court is so disposed. Thus, the assertive
tribal court enjoys an advantage in holding on to civil litigation filed before it.
Facts like those in Williams v. Lee-a non-Indian plaintiff doing business on
the reservation, suing an Indian defendant over events on the
reservation--create clear and exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal court. Facts
like those in Strate and Plains Commerce Bank-two non-Indian parties and
events on non-Indian land within the reservation--create clear and exclusive
jurisdiction in the state court. Every other set of facts creates at least a
possibility of tribal court jurisdiction, and the tribal court gets the first
opportunity to weigh that possibility whenever the plaintiff chooses to initiate
the suit in tribal court or in some federal courts.
So Where Are We?
After the dust has settled, for our purposes here, it seems most important to
repeat that the field of tribal courts' civil jurisdiction remains largely
unsurveyed, although some benchmarks have been placed. The Supreme
Court of the United States, while quite active in recent years in this area,
scarcely has begun to deal with all the diverse civil cases and controversies
that come before tribal courts, with their enormous disparity in attendant
137. Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991); Wellman v. Chevron,
Inc., 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
138. Nat'l Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985).
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circumstances, parties, and connections to Indian Country or to non-Indian
lands. That simple fact leaves a great deal ofjurisdictional definition to lower
federal courts, but even more-perhaps the bulk of it-to state courts and
especially to tribal courts, as they work out patterns in the lacunae left outside
direct appeals to federal courts.
It should be noted again here-as at the beginning of this section-that the
federal Indian law of tribal court jurisdiction imposes limits on tribal courts,
in favor of state courts. Presumably, however, the state courts do not have to
take everything that Indian law gives them, any more than the State of
Montana had to regulate fishing on the Big Horn River in place of the Crow
Tribe when the Supreme Court said it could. Nor do tribal courts have to take
jurisdiction of every civil lawsuit that might properly fall within their power.
Concurrent jurisdiction should become a more common option. Many rules
exist in conflict of laws doctrine that permit a court to abstain from exercising
its jurisdiction in favor of another court better situated to make a determination
in a given case. 39 Likewise, then, there is leeway for what a given state's
courts may wish to adjudicate and what they may wish to leave to tribal
adjudication, or vice versa, regardless of the federal Indian law of tribal court
jurisdiction. Given all of the above factors, that jurisdiction may vary from
state to state, and-for the Navajo Nation's courts-within the same tribal
court, depending on which of three states is involved on the other side of the
jurisdictional issue.
State Court Applications of Federal Indian Law to the Question of Navajo
Tribal Courts' Jurisdiction
The courts of the three states in which the Navajo Nation lies have an
emerging body of reported case law dealing with when they should exercise
jurisdiction over civil controversies involving matters with implications for the
sovereignty of the Navajo Nation and Navajo Indian Country. Perhaps
indicating the relative infancy of the issue, to date the three states' courts have
not developed a consistent doctrine.
This study deals first with Arizona, partly because it is the author's home
state and partly because it has generated recent cases of iconoclastic bent. It
establishes an extreme position in favor of imposing Arizona state law on
events affecting the Navajo Nation, through aggressive exercise of civil
jurisdiction. While New Mexico courts also have decided a number of cases
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 84-85; NAvAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, §
253a(E) (2005).
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on the issue, they have maintained a more measured approach. The New
Mexico approach finds an echo in Utah, although Utah does not have the depth
of case law that the other two do. Two of the New Mexico cases treated here
to derive that state's approach deal with criminal jurisdiction-which would
normally fall outside our consideration-for the insight they provide on New
Mexico's attitude toward jurisdiction in general.
From the select group of cases discussed here-four from Arizona, three
from New Mexico and one from Utah-we should adequately define the
parameters and attitudes of each state regarding the issue of when its courts
may exercise civil jurisdiction over matters involving Indians. All stem from
circumstances involving the Navajo Nation.
Arizona: Begay v. Roberts, an Arizona State Court Opinion Protecting
Navajo Sovereignty from Infringement by Denying State Jurisdiction to
Garnish Wages on the Navajo Reservation
The first Arizona case is Begay v. Roberts,'" a classic collections case
turning on wage garnishment. The judgment debtor, Tony Begay, was a
Navajo residing and working on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona.
He purchased an automobile off the reservation, on credit, and failed to make
monthly payments. The creditor filed a complaint in Arizona state justice
court and served Begay by registered mail delivered to his reservation address.
Begay objected that the state court lacked jurisdiction and the matter belonged
in tribal court, but the trial went ahead and he suffered a judgment. When
Begay continued to miss payments, the creditor sued him again and obtained
a second judgment. The judgment creditor then had writs of garnishment
issued against Begay's employer, a political subdivision of the state providing
utilities throughout Arizona and on the Navajo Reservation.
The writ of garnishment on the first judgment was served on the employer
at an office on the reservation; the second at an office off the reservation.
Begay answered, claiming his wages were not subject to garnishment under
writs issued by the state court because he earned the wages on the reservation.
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that the Arizona state court
"clearly had jurisdiction to issue the writs of garnishment" against Begay's
employer, but because Begay lived and worked on the reservation, "this case
cannot be decided without considering the Indian law implications.
140. 807 P.2d 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
141. Id. at 1114.
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The Court of Appeals opinion in Begay relied on Williams v. Lee and
McClanahan, and on lower federal court and state court decisions 42 applying
those opinions, for the proposition that "tribal courts have inherent power to
adjudicate civil disputes affecting the interests of Indians and non-Indians
which are based upon events occurring on the reservation."1 43 The Court of
Appeals framed the ultimate question as "whether the exercise of state court
jurisdiction in a given case will 'frustrate federal policy or violate traditional
notions of tribal sovereignty.'"44
It then upheld the justice court's jurisdiction over the actions underlying the
judgments, since Begay had gone off the reservation to conduct consensual
commercial activity with a merchant who had sought no presence within the
confines of the reservation.1 45 It also approved the use of registered mail to
serve process 46 and acquire personal jurisdiction over Begay, lest he "retreat
back to the reservation to escape service of process."'47  Different
considerations, however, applied to the garnishment of wages earned on the
Navajo Reservation by a Navajo living there and working for a company doing
business there. The court held that wage garnishments against Begay's
employer were preempted since they would infringe upon Navajo tribal
sovereignty, and the state court had no jurisdiction to issue them.
41
The fact that Navajo law did not provide for collections through wage
garnishment 49 was an important consideration. When the judgment creditor
142. The court especially relied on Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Casualty& Surety Co., 720
P.2d 499 (Ariz. 1986) (3-2 vote) (holding that state court had jurisdiction over a non-Indian
surety in a suit by a supplier against the Navajo Housing Authority where the supplier and
surety were non-Indians located off-reservation). The Smith Plumbing opinion stated,
"Although preemption analysis begins with whether specific congressional acts govern a given
state action, it ultimately amounts to whether Indian self-government is implicated." Id. at 504.
143. Begay, 807 P.2d at 1114 (quoting Smith Plumbing, 720 P.2d at 504).
144. Id. at 1115.
145. Had there been no jurisdiction, the writs of garnishment would have been invalid, since
jurisdiction may always be raised as a bar. Note that a holding that the state court had
jurisdiction does not exclude the possibility that the Navajo tribal court might also have
exercised proper jurisdiction over the dispute between Begay and his creditor. It simply
approves the jurisdiction of the state court, since it offends no sovereign interest that might
make Navajo jurisdiction exclusive.
146. This was provided for in ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 4.
147. Begay, 807 P.2d at 1118 (quoting Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1112
(Ariz. 1989)).
148. Id.
149. The same is true of the laws of several states, notably Texas and Pennsylvania. 42 PA.
CON. STAT. ANN. § 8127; TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 28.
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argued the garnishment took place off the reservation, since the employer was
located there, too, the court held that "the effect of the garnishment will be felt
by Begay on the reservation" and that would thwart the Navajo policy against
wage garnishment. 15 ° The Court of Appeals relied on a federal decision
making the same distinction where a New Mexico state court had attempted
wage garnishment of a reservation Navajo,' a federal decision preventing an
attempt by an off-reservation seller to repossess a reservation Navajo's
automobile on the reservation,'52 and McClanahan.
The Arizona Court of Appeals decided Begay at a time when both the
infringement test from Williams. 3 and the preemption doctrine of
McClanahan,"s4 augmented by the exhaustion cases of National Farmers'.
and Iowa Mutual,' had not yet run afoul of Strate-Montana. Thus, Begay
prohibited the exercise of state court jurisdiction to carry out collections
through means prohibited by Navajo law, where such means impacted the
reservation domicile and livelihood of a Navajo member, but it did not prevent
service of process and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the same
member by means provided for in the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure,
whose long arm reached onto the reservation to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant growing out of an obligation that he sought out and consented
to off the reservation.
The Arizona Supreme Court-having denied certiorari in Begay-soon took
up the issues of personal and subject matterjurisdiction and service of process,
drawing new guidelines after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Strate.
150. Begay, 807 P.2d at 1116.
151. Joe v. Marcum, 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
152. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983). Navajo law
prohibits both garnishment and self-help repossession of a vehicle. Perhaps the seller in Begay
was aware of the Babbitt Ford decision and for that reason did not pursue the possibility of
repossessing the automobile from Tony Begay, so long as he kept it on the reservation.
Repossession would be the normal response by the creditor in case of non-payment, especially
where an automobile is at issue, and all states permit it under their adoptions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
153. SeeBegay, 807 P.2d at 1115, 1117.
154. Seeid. at 1114-15, 1117.
155. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
156. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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Zaman I and Zaman II: Two Arizona Supreme Court Decisions that
Demonstrate Aggressive State Exercise
Akhtar Zaman, a non-Indian living on the Navajo Reservation, had a five-
year relationship with Barbara Wilson, a member of the Navajo Nation.
During that time Sahira Zaman, allegedly the child of Akhtar, was born to
Barbara. The mother, who received aid for Sahira from the State of Arizona,
assigned her rights to the state, which proceeded to file suit against Akhtar in
state court for purposes of determining paternity, custody, and child support
obligations. The two Zaman cases dealt with whether the state had jurisdiction
over the paternity suit (Zaman /57) and whether service of process was
properly carried out by a sheriff's deputy who went on the reservation to find
and serve the defendant (Zaman II1'). The Arizona Court of Appeals found
that the state lacked jurisdiction, but the Arizona Supreme Court overruled the
lower court and then found service of process was proper.
In Zaman I, the defendant argued that the infringement test should have
prevented jurisdiction over the paternity suit in the state court, even though the
plaintiff was an Indian and he was not, because "the infringement test seeks to
protect the collective interests of the tribe, not the interests of individual tribal
members."' 59 The court categorically rejected the argument, stating that no
Supreme Court case had considered the issue from the perspective of the
collective interests of the tribe and reasoning that where the rights and interests
of an individual Indian were at issue "the relevant inquiry is the infringement
of individual rights.' 6 ° It also rejected an argument based on the federal
exhaustion requirement that the Arizona court should exercise "judicial
restraint" and not take the case even if it had the power to do so until the
Navajo tribal court had determined whether it had jurisdiction.'61
To this observer, the Arizona Supreme Court failed to engage the arguments
presented against jurisdiction, imposing formalistic-virtually ad
hominem-reasoning to reach its result. This impression increases to
conviction upon consideration of the thorough and thoroughly reasoned Court
of Appeals opinion 62 the Arizona Supreme Court overruled. The intermediate
appellate court opinion sorted through the relevant Navajo law and
157. State v. Zaman, 946 P.2d 459 (Ariz. 1997).
158. State v. Zaman, 984 P.2d 528 (Ariz. 1999).
159. Zaman, 946 P.2d at 462.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 463.
162. State v. Zaman, 927 P.2d 347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
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demonstrated that the issues in Zaman mattered to the Navajo Nation, based
on Navajo case law,'63 and that tribal courts would have had and asserted
jurisdiction." 4 The Court of Appeals discussed relevant case law from other
jurisdictions on the question, found the better rule favors rejection of
jurisdiction in the state court, 6 ' and held that "the [state trial court] lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over this paternity proceeding." '66
The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion deals with none of the Court of
Appeals' reasoning or sources, acting as if they simply did not exist. The
Arizona Supreme Court asserted without citation that where an Indian files suit
in state court against a non-Indian "[t]he Indian interests which the
infringement test seeks to protect are not present.' ' 67  The naked
result-especially in light of the excellent substantive discussion in the Court
of Appeals opinion that it overruled-leaves one decidedly unsatisfied and
harboring the sort of feelings of professional embarrassment that arise upon
encountering a bad piece of judicial workmanship. Perhaps, however, the
Arizona Supreme Court felt a jurisdictional imperative and asserted its
hierarchical advantage 61 to head off the Court of Appeals' inclination to
restraint. 169 In any event, it created a categorical Arizona precedent that should
encourage its state courts to exercise jurisdiction over Indian cases whenever
a non-Indian is a party, plaintiff or defendant. 70
163. Id. at 350-51.
164. Id. at 352. The Arizona Supreme Court majority opinion ignored this analysis and
found that Navajo court jurisdiction was "an uncertain proposition at best." See Zaman, 946
P.2d at 461.
165. Zaman, 927 P.2d at 352-54.
166. Id. at 355.
167. Zaman, 946 P.2d at 461. The same opinion found that the appellant had not argued
preemption, so it was not necessary to address that issue. Id. The Court of Appeals opinion
finds the preemption question at issue and discusses it at length. See Zaman, 927 P.2d at 349-
50.
168. After the Supreme Court's resolution and reasoning become the law of Arizona, the
Court of Appeals opinion ceases to have any effect.
169. Note that the Arizona Court of Appeals resolved the case by invoking the collective
interests of the tribe over the interests of an individual. At the oral argument in Plains
Commerce Bank, the Supreme Court of the United States, or at least Justice Kennedy, showed
a concern for the due process and other constitutional rights of a nonmember before a tribal
court. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 56-57, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land
& Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008) (No. 07-411).
170. Zaman did appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which denied certiorari.
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The Arizona Supreme Court's assertion of state court power did not abate
in Zaman II, although the unanimity of Zaman I was replaced by a 3-2 vote,
generating a careful dissent and a hesitant concurrence by a judge who
counseled against the practice his deciding vote approved. Zaman 11 approved
service of process by an Arizona sheriffs deputy who personally served
Zaman on the reservation. Unhindered by a Court of Appeals decision on the
issue, the majority's decision turned on the fact that Zaman was a non-Indian,
stating that "the status of the defendant as an Indian or a non-Indian is the sine
qua non of federal Indian law."'71 The majority opinion worked through the
arguments of the dissent but did not meet its reasoning, simply reiterating that
nothing in the dissent overcame the determinative effect of Zaman's non-
Indian status.
Like Zaman I, the majority opinion in Zaman II was formalistic in its
analysis, spare in its authority, and careful to avoid any consideration of the
Navajo Nation's collective interests in the case. This is curious. Service of
process and other procedural matters create some of the most sensitive issues
in private international law. Many countries have declared the United States'
procedural rules and practices against public policy and even specified
criminal charges for their exercise, 172 a fact not likely lost on judges in a border
state with significant cross-border litigation.
The concurrence (and deciding third vote) in Zaman II seems aware that the
tribe does have interests when it states,
In the interest of the state's relationship with the tribes, litigants are
encouraged to use ... alternative methods [of service] whenever
and wherever reasonably feasible in order to avoid the unnecessary
presence of county law enforcement officers in Indian Country and
the potential for conflict which may arise from such presence.
173
What the concurrence would recommend, the dissent would have imposed as
the Arizona rule.
It is the dissent that engages the issue of tribal concerns and finds that the
rationale for not permitting state officials to enter the reservation to serve
process "extends to non-Indians located on the reservation."' 74 The dissent
would have held that the Navajo Reservation should be treated like a sister
171. Zaman,946P.2dat 461.
172. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVLLITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 774-
94 (1996).
173. Zaman, 946 P.2d at 531.
174. Id.
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state such as California or New Mexico, where long-arm service by mail or
private process server would be appropriate but personal service by an Arizona
law officer would not. "Arizona rules provide ample means for long-arm
service without invading the territorial integrity of another sovereign" by the
person of a law officer "with process in hand and gun on hip."' 15 The Navajo
Rules of Civil Procedure also provide for several means of service that could
have been used, including appointment of a state officer by the Navajo court
as a temporary tribal officer for purposes of service.
The dissent based its argument in comity,
Recognition of state official personal service in Navajo territory
does not turn only on the state's relationship with the litigant or
even its power, but also on its relationship with the Navajo
Nation.... [G]ood judgment and respect dictate an easier and
better resolution. . . .Even if, as the majority contends, the
constitution permits us this power, it does not require us to exercise
it. As a matter of state law we could and should show our respect
for Navajo sovereignty.'76
Astorga v. Wing: Concurrent Jurisdiction Does Not Require a State Court
to Stand Aside When the Case Might Go Forward in Tribal Court
In general terms, we have seen tribal courts normally have jurisdiction over
non-Indians who come on the reservation seeking to do business with
Indians, 177 but, as Zaman I indicates, Indian plaintiffs may choose to bring suit
in Arizona state court and there may be some confusion as to how far tribal
jurisdiction may extend over non-Indians.17 1 In Astorga v. Wing,179 a Court of
175. Id. at 532.
176. Id. at 533.
177. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
565-66 (1981); CANBY,supra note 11, at201-11,225. Regarding the "typical reservation-based
claim brought by an Indian plaintiff against a non-member," Canby first noted that when a tribal
member is the defendant in a standard civil suit, "tribal jurisdiction is exclusive under Williams
v. Lee," and then remarked, "[W]hen the subject of the litigation is exactly the same, but the
tribal member is the plaintiff instead of the defendant, the tribal interest is very nearly as
strong." Id. at 207.
178. To some degree, the issue of tribal courts' civil jurisdiction over non-Indians has come
on only in recent years because for many years, tribal courts did not attempt to exercise such
jurisdiction, preferring to either solicit non-Indians' stipulations or not attempt to compel them
to appear. With the growth of tribal courts and their more aggressive use ofjurisdictional power
over non-Indians, the universe of civil cases and non-Indian defendants in tribal courts has
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Appeals decision, Indian plaintiffs against a non-Indian defendant attempted
to hedge against the possibility that the tribal court might feel that it either
lacked jurisdiction or chose not to exercise it.
The defendant was a mortuary in Winslow, Arizona, that had a contract
with Navajo Social Services to provide funerals for Navajo indigents.
Plaintiffs were seven Navajo siblings who filed suit against the defendant for
"wrongful burial and infliction of emotional distress" because defendant
allegedly had botched the burial of their Navajo mother. Eleven days after
filing the original lawsuit in Navajo District Court, and shortly before the two-
year statute of limitations ran, the plaintiffs filed virtually the same complaint
in state Superior Court, seeking a "jurisdictional backstop" in case for any
reason the tribal lawsuit did not proceed. They asked the state court to accept
the suit and then immediately stay proceedings until and unless the plaintiffs
came back to it. The state court refused to play along, denying the request for
a stay and instead proceeding with the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision.
Astorga provides insight into the different parlays between state and tribal
courts and those where federal and tribal courts are involved. The federal
court would have waited for the tribal court to exhaust determination of its
own jurisdiction under Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union, reserving
the right to review that exercise.'° Indeed, the plaintiffs in Astorga argued the
state had the same exhaustion requirement the federal courts did, alleging that
"comity and respect for Indian courts require that tribal courts be allowed to
determine their own jurisdiction and exhaust it, prior to a matter being brought
in either federal or state courts."'' The plaintiffs also pointed to an Arizona
case that held a stay was correct when the same action was pending in "two
courts of separate sovereigns."'
82
increased. See CANBY, supra note 11, at 201.
179. 118 P.3d 1103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
180. None of the Strate exceptions should have applied to a case so straightforward as to
defendant's presence on the reservation. Perhaps the case most illustrative of the federal
deferral to tribal courts is Wellman v. Chevron, 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987), which held that
an Indian contractor could not bring a civil suit in federal court against a non-tribal entity when
a tribal court had apparent concurrent jurisdiction.
181. Astorga, 118 P.3d at 1106. Perhaps the plaintiffs took their argument from Judge
Canby's book, for it states, "If the federal courts must defer to tribal courts to avoid undue
interference with tribal adjudication of claims by tribal members against nonmembers, it is
difficult to see why state courts should not be required to do the same." CANBY, supra note 11,
at 210.
182. Tonnemacher v. Touche Ross & Co., 920 P.2d 5, 10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). The two
courts in Tonnemacher were state and federal, and Arizona stayed the suit in state court while
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The state Court of Appeals distinguished the relationship between federal
and tribal courts, characterizing it as "vertical (at least in part)," from that
between state courts and tribal courts, "because whether the Indian court has
jurisdiction over the matter is not at issue in the state court proceeding.' 83
Given jurisdiction in the state court, the Court of Appeals then reasoned that
the state trial court had discretion whether to grant a stay or not and noted it
might properly proceed simultaneously, taking into account the defendant's
"right to have the case decided in a reasonably timely manner."'" Since two
years had gone by since the case had been filed there and the Navajo court still
had not decided whether it had jurisdiction, the state court had good reason to
deny the stay.
Arizona's General Approach: Aggressive Assertion of State Jurisdiction to
the Exclusion of Tribal Courts
Astorga seems a reasonable exercise of state court discretion where Indian
plaintiffs had chosen to seek relief (even if only as a backstop) in the state
court. Begay likewise seems a reasonable application of United States
Supreme Court doctrine by the state court, which found jurisdiction where an
Indian buyer-debtor left the reservation to seek out a non-Indian seller-
creditor, but eschewed any power to collect the resulting judgment by wage
garnishment on the reservation. The Zaman decisions, however, demonstrate
that the Arizona Supreme Court is inclined to find state court jurisdiction at the
expense of Navajo sovereignty. Neither opinion deigned to even consider the
possibility that Navajo interests might be implicated. They simply rejected the
possibility a priori. Zaman I is quite striking in this respect, and one wonders
how such an approach garnered a unanimous vote, the more so for its
imperious treatment of the Court of Appeals opinion.' 5 The dissent in Zaman
II carefully detailed obvious tribal sensitivity as the appropriate basis for self-
it proceeded in federal court.
183. Astorga, 118 P.3d at 1106-07.
184. Id. at 1109.
185. The salient example is the Arizona Court of Appeals' careful conclusion that the
Navajo tribal court would probably take jurisdiction of the case, based on its analysis of tribal
case law and United States Supreme Court doctrine. See State v. Zaman, 927 P.2d 347, 352
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). The Arizona Supreme Court opinion simply states, without referring to
the Court of Appeals opinion or attempting to provide contrary supporting citation or authority,
"the Navajo court has no jurisdiction" and "tribal jurisdiction is uncertain at best." See State
v. Zaman, 946 P.2d 459, 461, 464 (Ariz. 1997).
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restraint on the part of the state, but the two-vote majority opinion summarily
rejected that approach as irrelevant.
As things stand now in Arizona, to judge by its most recent Supreme Court
precedents, whenever litigation involves a non-Indian party---even if resident
on the reservation-the state's lower courts should feel little reason to find the
levels of infringement or preemption that would trigger exclusive tribal civil
jurisdiction.
New Mexico
The State of New Mexico has generated a lot of case law on the civil
jurisdiction of tribal courts. Its high court recognized and applied the Williams
v. Lee infringement test within three years after that decision'86 and appears
thoroughly familiar with McClanahan and the preemption doctrine."8 7
Tempest Recovery Services v. Belone, the Latest in a Long Line of Common
Sense Accommodations of Tribal Interests by the New Mexico Supreme Court
New Mexico's most recent case on infringement and the possibility of
exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal court, Tempest Recovery Services, Inc. v.
Belone,88 raised the perennial issue of an off-reservation creditor's
repossession of a tribal member's vehicle on tribal land'89 in violation of
Navajo law. 9 ' In Tempest Recovery a Navajo tribal member purchased a car
in Arizona. Seller gave him credit under a retail installment contract, taking
a security interest in the car, and buyer thereafter stopped making payments.
Pursuing collection under assignment of the contract, Tempest Recovery
Services repossessed the car at Belone's residence, not on the reservation
proper but within Indian Country.' 91 Tempest Recovery then brought suit in
186. See Chino v. Chino, 561 P.2d 476, 478 (N.M. 1977); Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v.
Garcia, 734 P.2d 754, 755 (N.M. 1987).
187. See Chino, 561 P.2d at 478-79; Hartley v. Baca, 640 P.2d 941, 943 (N.M. App. Ct.
1981).
188. 74 P.3d 67 (N.M. 2003).
189. The Navajo Nation courts and all the neighboring states' courts have dealt with the
issue at various times. Babbitt Ford v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983);
Peterson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2 Navajo Rptr. 36 (1979).
190. NAvAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 62 1(A) (2005). At the time of Tempest Recovery, the
provision was NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 607.
191. At the time of the repossession, there was New Mexico case authority for the
proposition that Belone did not live in Indian Country because he lived on allotted Indian land
outside the reservation boundaries, in the Rock Springs Navajo community. Tempest Recovery
429
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
New Mexico state court for a deficiency judgment, and Belone filed a
counterclaim for wrongful repossession. Belone also objected to the state
court jurisdiction, arguing that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the tribal court.
The Tempest Recovery opinion brings federal Indian law and that of New
Mexico's own court 92 up to 2003, providing the doctrinal context for
resolving the fresh case before it. It reaffirms its reliance on the 1959 Williams
v. Lee infringement test, which it applies by considering three factors:
(1) whether the parties are Indians or non-Indians;
(2) whether the cause of action arose within the Indian
reservation; and
(3) what is the nature of the interest to be protected. 93
It also notes that its case law has identified three circumstances in
which exclusive tribal court jurisdiction is appropriate
(1) where an action involves a proprietary interest in Indian land;
(2) when an Indian sues another Indian on a claim for relief
recognized only by tribal custom and law; or
(3) when an Indian is being sued by a non-Indian over an
occurrence or transaction arising in Indian country. 94
Thus oriented within the law, the court notes this is not a case that meets
one of the categories for exclusive tribal jurisdiction and proceeds to test the
circumstances for infringement. As in the Arizona case of Begay v. Roberts,
the court distinguished between the basic contract claim and the collection
activities. It found the contract claim had not arisen in Indian Country, and the
state court shared concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal court over that
matter. 95 With respect to the wrongful repossession counterclaim, the court
held that it "clearly" arose in Indian Country and might have given rise to
exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal court,'96 but "Belone chose to raise his
counterclaim in state court."' 97 Since that was his election, the court found
relied on subsequent Supreme Court decisions to specifically overrule the New Mexico
precedent. See Tempest, 74 P.3d at 70-71.
192. Specifically, it cites to Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. v. Garcia, 734 P.2d 754
(N.M. 1987), and Chino v. Chino, 561 P.2d 476 (N.M. 1977).
193. Tempest, 74 P.3d at 71.
194. Id. (numbered paragraphs supplied).
195. I.e., Tempest Recovery alternatively could have sued the Navajo tribal member debtor,
a resident of Navajo Indian Country, in Navajo tribal court.
196. Tempest, 74 P.3d at 71.
197. Id. at 72. The court does note that debtor-defendant did not initiate the lawsuit in state
court and that his counterclaim likely was compulsory.
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concurrent jurisdiction on the counterclaim, also. It did, however, remand to
the state trial court to determine whether it should apply Navajo law to the
counterclaim. '98
The Tempest Recovery opinion did a good job of parsing out the interests
that determine jurisdiction for a single case involving both a claim that the
state may take and a second claim that normally might have been denied to the
state in favor of exclusive tribal jurisdiction. It approved state court
jurisdiction for both claims, but mitigated any imposition on debtor-plaintiff
because of the state court's incidental jurisdiction over the counterclaim by
intimating that the trial court might best apply Navajo law to that issue on
remand.'
Unlike the defendant in Zaman I, the debtor in Tempest Recovery had little
occasion to invoke tribal interests, since he had gone off the reservation to
buy his car and the repossession-which the court might have prevented
before the fact ° -had already occurred. He asked simple compensation after
the fact. The opinion is well-versed in United States Supreme Court
precedent and other case law and projects the New Mexico Supreme Court's
comfort with recognizing tribal court jurisdiction, exclusive or concurrent,
depending on the circumstances. Based on this and its other decisions, the
New Mexico court appears amenable to giving over exclusive jurisdiction to
the tribe in civil matters where circumstances might so dictate; it simply did
not feel the particulars of Tempest Recovery made tribal jurisdiction exclusive
in that case.
198. Id. at 68, 71.
199. Id.
200. Not only did the court note that the repossession fell into a class of activities giving rise
to claims exclusive to tribal court jurisdiction, it also noted that the installment contract
provided that Arizona law should apply, except for collections. In the latter case, the contract
provided that the law of the "state" where the repossession was carried out should apply.
Whether the Navajo Nation qualified as a "state" for purposes of that clause is a nice question,
but the New Mexico court seemed disposed to find that it did. Id. at 67.
201. The three-point test for exclusivejurisdiction first appeared in Chino v. Chino, 561 P.2d
476,479 (N.M. 1977). Before Tempest Recovery, the test was faithfully repeated in Foundation
Reserve Insurance Co. v. Garcia, 734 P.2d 754,755 (N.M. 1987), and Wacondo v. Concha, 873
P.2d 276 (N.M. App. Ct. 1994), two cases that found concurrent jurisdiction. Another case that,
like Chino, used the test to find no state jurisdiction was Hartley v. Baca, 640 P.2d 941, 943
(N.M. App. Ct. 1981).
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The Law of Criminal Procedure and the Basis of New Mexico State Court
Deference to Tribal Sovereignty
Perhaps the New Mexico judiciary's attitude of concern for and sensitivity
to tribal sovereignty may best be demonstrated by its sure touch with criminal
jurisdiction. In two cases, decided in 1976 and 1995, the New Mexico Supreme
Court invalidated arrests and denied state criminal jurisdiction where state
officers continued hot pursuit of criminal suspects into Indian Country rather
than utilize cooperative mechanisms-specifically extradition-available
through the tribal judiciary."2 In light of Nevada v. Hicks2°3 and other United
States Supreme Court decisions, the New Mexico court might have permitted
such intrusions consistent with the Supreme Court of the United States'
constricted vision of Indian criminal jurisdiction. Perhaps, however, states
consider-or should consider-factors other than the absolute extent of their
power under federal Indian law when they decide to defer to exclusive tribal
jurisdiction, in civil as in criminal matters.
Over thirty years ago, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Benally v.
Marcum. °  Police officers had chased a suspect through the City of
Farmington and, in hot pursuit, into the adjacent Navajo Reservation, where
they made an arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol.
The state high court held that the arrest was illegal because it violated tribal
sovereignty and infringed upon "the orderly procedure for extradition from the
Navajo Reservation" provided for in Navajo legislation. 25 The New Mexico
Supreme Court added a precatory note, "It does not behoove any court to
declare that the government may disregard the law in order to secure the
conviction of a law violator., 20
6
The City of Farmington, bounded by two immediately adjacent reservations,
apparently was not impressed. About twenty years later, it was still pursuing
suspects onto the Navajo Reservation and arresting them there. When one of
the suspects (no immediate relation to the original Benally) again objected
after his arrest, City ofFarmington v. Benally0 7 gave the city the opportunity
to challenge Benally v. Marcum. There was some basis for the challenge in
202. The Navajo Nation Code provides for extradition. NAvAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, §§
1001-1002 (2005).
203. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
204. 553 P.2d 1270 (N.M. 1976).
205. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, §§ 1001-1002.
206. Benally, 553 P.2d at 1274.
207. 892 P.2d 629 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
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emerging law. The United States Supreme Court had decided Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe208 just two years after the first New Mexico case.
Oliphant held that Indian tribes' status as domestic dependent sovereigns
dictated that they could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers
and opened an era of apparentjudicial whittling at tribal jurisdiction, discussed
above in the civil context.
Montana followed Oliphant by three years, and soon the highest court had
held that-also by dint of their domestic dependent sovereignty-tribes could
not regulate liquor sales on their reservations. 21 Other jurisdiction-reducing
opinions followed,2 0 and in 1990 the United States Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of criminal jurisdiction, this time to hold that no Indian
tribe could exercise criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian for a crime
committed on their reservation.211 Although the court handed down the Strate
decision in 1997,212 that case was working its way to the United States
Supreme Court at the same time that City of Farmington v. Benally was
coming through the New Mexico judicial system.
Despite any tendencies that it may have perceived in the Supreme Court of
the United States, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held firm. The court
found the city had "challenge[d] the tribe's right to make and enforce laws for
Navajo citizens on Navajo land,, 213 the very essence of sovereignty and more
than sufficient reason to invalidate the arrest. The City of Farmington opinion
turned on the "unique status" of Indian tribes in the United States system and
a special "respect for the sovereignty of an Indian government and the special
status of its citizens., 2 4 Those considerations made the jurisdictional issue
different from what it would have been had the arrest occurred in another state
or even another country. The City of Farmington opinion noted that case
precedent generally allowed the prosecuting state to go ahead with a criminal
trial, even where the accused had been arrested illegally outside its state
borders, but stated "those cases do not account for the special factors... that
are unique to considering a state's unlawful arrest of an Indian on Indian
208. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
209. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
210. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
211. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). Congress immediately passed a statute
overturning the Duro result. 18 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
212. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
213. City of Farmington v. Benally, 892 P.2d 629, 630 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
214. Id. at 632.
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land. 215 It then reaffirmed the decision of twenty years before and invalidated
the arrest and the prosecution.
Even though it is a criminal case, City ofFarmington sheds interesting light
on the role of state law in mediating questions of tribal civil jurisdiction. Five
years after it was decided, the United States high court decided Nevada v.
Hicks,216 which at first impression might be read to overrule City of
Farmington. Hicks involved tort claims in tribal court against state officers,
growing out of a search for criminal evidence that allegedly damaged
plaintiff's property in the process. The officers who conducted the search had
gotten a search warrant 7 from a state court judge and then served it on a tribal
member at his residence on Indian reservation land before they conducted a
fruitless search. The United States Supreme Court held that the tribe had no
jurisdiction over non-Indian officers and their conduct in carrying out a search
of an Indian residence on trust land while seeking evidence related to an
alleged crime committed off the reservation. The Strate-Montana rule that
tribal judicial jurisdiction may not exceed tribal legislative jurisdiction carried
the day.
One might feel that the City of Farmington advocates who argued to
overturn Benally v. Marcum in 1995 were prescient, but six years before their
time, and should now-armed with Hicks-again try their luck before the
Supreme Court of New Mexico. In fact, that view would be wrong, for the
following reasons. Cooperative agreements between state and tribal
authorities had been the standard before Hicks and have continued to be the
standard since 21 1 for all the reasons discussed by the dissent in Zaman 11.219
There exist palpable reasons for avoiding official presence of the state or other
foreign authorities on Indian land. Moreover, Hicks may be classified as a
special case, involving a state criminal statute.220
The power to exercise jurisdiction does not dictate that the jurisdiction must
be exercised. As Judge Feldman, referring to service of civil process, pointed
215. Id.
216. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
217. An earlier search warrant issued by the same state court had required approval by the
tribal court before it was valid. The second warrant did not include that contingency, but in
both cases the officers obtained tribal court warrants before conducting their search. Id. at 356.
218. CANBY, supra note 11, at 84-85 (also pointing out that some states have decided to
abandon the cooperative tradition, however); see Inyo County v. Paiute-Shosone Indians of the
Bishop Cmty., 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
219. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
220. The statute is a Nevada law prohibiting the killing or possession of certain protected
animals. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.376 (West 2000).
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out in his dissent in Zaman II, "Even if ... the constitution permits us this
power, it does not require us to exercise it. As a matter of state law we could
and should show our respect for Navajo sovereignty. ' 2 2 ' The New Mexico
Supreme Court appears to adopt as its unanimous holding the approach that
Feldman's dissent advocates. The advent of Strate-Montana and Hicks should
not change that approach in New Mexico or in other states that embrace it.
New Mexico: A Venue that Practices Kinder, Gentler Ways Towards Tribal
Jurisdiction
Overall, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has demonstrated the kind of
balanced approach to Indian civil jurisdiction that resolves cases in a
workmanlike manner, applying the Supreme Court of the United States' case
law in good faith but feeling no particular need to deny tribal jurisdiction in
every instance case law might permit. Likewise, the New Mexico court has
shown a good nose for the subjective nature of preemption-infringement
analysis in the Strate-Montana era. It uses circumstantial analysis and seems
to keep in mind the backdrop of Indian sovereignty and its purposes in the
federal system.
Utah: Distinguishing Between Preemption-Infringement Factors
Utah does not have the exposure to the Navajos or to other Indians that
Arizona and New Mexico do. Nonetheless, some of the Navajo Reservation
lays in Utah, as do other tribal reservations, and questions of tribal jurisdiction
do arise in that state. One leading Utah case, Maryboy v. Utah State Tax
Commission,22 sheds perspective on the issue. A Navajo married couple
resident on reservation land in Montezuma Creek, Utah, considered themselves
exempt from Utah state income taxes since they were both employed
exclusively on the reservation. The state assessed back taxes and penalties for
three prior years' income. Mrs. Maryboy worked as a therapist for a mental
health clinic maintained for Navajos by the Utah Department of Human
Services. Mr. Maryboy was elected to the paid position of San Juan County
Commissioner and also worked as the Division Director of the Utah Navajo
Development Counsel.
The Maryboys invoked McClanahan for the proposition that the state "had
no power to tax income they earned from on-Reservation activities."223 The
221. State v. Zaman, 984 P.2d 528, 533 (Ariz. 1999) (Feldman, J., dissenting).
222. 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995).
223. Id. at 665,667 (phrasing the argument as a "per se rule against taxing Native Americans
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state argued in turn that nothing had preempted the state's taxing power. The
Utah court disagreed with the Maryboys categorical argument and turned to
a "flexible and particularized analysis"224 of preemption and infringement.
The Maryboy opinion provides a well-reasoned example of a state court's
efforts to apply the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States on civil
jurisdiction for matters involving Indians and Indian Country. The Supreme
Court of Utah conducted a painstaking review of the Supreme Court of the
United States' case law to derive the appropriate doctrine for the case at hand.
At the end of its labors, the court found that
[w]hile protection of the interests of tribal self-government alone
can be a sufficient bar to a state's exercise of authority on the
reservation, it is related to the preemption analysis because the
"right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and
subject to the broad power of Congress." Thus, when assessing the
validity of a state tax, the Supreme Court has generally focused on
a preemption analysis with the principles of tribal self-government
acting as a backdrop.225
Thus oriented, the Utah court weighed the state interests to see if they
overcame "the McClanahan presumption against state taxing jurisdiction." '226
In the case of Mrs. Maryboy, although she worked as a mental therapist for a
service provided by the state, her work involved only tribal members and
occurred only on the reservation; functionally, her services were more like
those normally found in the private sector.227 The state did have an interest,
but it was not sufficient to overcome the presumption against its authority to
tax Mrs. Maryboy's income.
Mr. Maryboy, however, presented a different set of facts and a different
result. In his job as a county commissioner for San Juan County he worked for
the state, carrying out state functions even when he was on the reservation.
The court found the state's interest "could not be more compelling '228 and
allowed state taxation of Mr. Maryboy's income as a county commissioner.
who reside on the reservation and derive their income from activities that take place on the
reservation").
224. Id.
225. Id. at 666-67 (internal citation omitted).
226. Maryboy, 904 P.2d at 668.
227. Mrs. Maryboy did have "administrative and training activities" that took her off the
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While Maryboy is not a case that directly involved the question of tribal
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, it is instructive for that purpose. It
demonstrates in the context of a married couple that the question of
preemption, measured against the backdrop of infringement," 9 is indeed a
flexible and particularized analysis. Relatively small distinctions in
circumstances can-and should-create different resolutions of the same issue.
The Navajo Nation's Case Law on Civil Jurisdiction
While the state courts go about defining when they may take subject matter
or personal jurisdiction of events and persons implicating Indian Country, the
Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation has had repeated opportunities to
exercise its own independent judgment in defining its tribal courts' civil
jurisdiction. Any non-Indian defendant who finds himself in tribal court
typically objects to its jurisdiction as a first defense, so there are a great many
Navajo court decisions discussing the issue and the tribal judges have become
adept at the craft of resolving it, perhaps to a greater degree than most state
courts. The Navajo courts apply the same United States Supreme Court
precedents the state courts do and weigh the same federal statutes, but the
Navajo case law has reached different conclusions than the states.
The Navajo Tribal Council has set down a solid statutory base from which
to derive jurisdiction. The NNC provides for the broadest possible civil
jurisdiction, modeling its statute on state long-arm statues.23 ° In 2001, the
Tribal Council added a provision specifically titled "Long-Arm Civil
Jurisdiction and Service of Process Act."23' Finally, the tribal code defines the
territorial reach of the tribal courts as broadly as possible.232 In other words,
229. Perhaps the Utah court read CANBY, supra note 11, at 89, as quoted at supra note 113.
230. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 253(A)(2) (2005). The section states,
A. The District Courts of the Navajo Nation shall have original jurisdiction
over:...
2. Civil Causes of Action. All civil actions in which the defendant: (1) is a
resident of Navajo Indian Country; or (2) has caused an action or injury to occur
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.
Id.
231. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 253a(C), (E), (F). Section 253a(C) adds a provision
detailing the circumstances that may create personal jurisdiction based on conduct, section
253a(E) provides for forum non conveniens practice by Navajo courts, and section 253a(F)
provides that "[a] Court of the Navajo Nation may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis
authorized by law, including the inherent and treaty jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation." Id.
232. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 254. The section extends territorial jurisdiction to
"Navajo Indian Country," which the same provision defines in the broadest possible terms,
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the legislative purpose of the Navajo Nation-in common with most states-is
to push its civil jurisdiction to the furthest extension permissible, relying on
federal Indian law-rather than constitutional due process-to place outer
limits on its expansive language.
The rules for determining civil jurisdiction contain plenty of room for
subjective judgments, tied as they are in almost every case to fact questions of
whether Indian sovereignty may be infringed, either through the Williams v.
Lee direct infringement test or through the Strate-Montana exceptions test or
whether the McClanahan preemption test applies. For a few fact situations,
the Supreme Court precedents seem to have resolved the jurisdictional
question, but there are constant variations in circumstances and elements that
call into issue the degree of infringement and/or the possibility of preemption,
which always-explicitly or implicitly-provide the determining factors.
One must also bear in mind the important differences in judicial perspective
when a tribal court looks at jurisdiction. Plaintiff has already filed the case in
tribal court when the defendant objects to tribal jurisdiction.233 The question
is not whether the connections to the tribe are so powerful as to create
exclusive jurisdiction in its court, but rather whether there are enough contacts
to sustain jurisdiction in that court, regardless of concurrent jurisdiction in a
state court. There is at play no concept of infringement on state sovereignty.
The only sovereignty in the balance is that of the tribe.
Not surprisingly, Navajo Nation courts show a tendency to find proper
subject matter jurisdiction and retain cases, rather than to consign them to
exclusive state court jurisdiction. Such a holding would necessitate a finding
that the tribal court has no connection that would allow it to keep the case. In
its opinions, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has identified multiple
connections. It has based its jurisdiction on simple inherent tribal sovereignty,
without a need to seek out the higher levels of exclusionary interest that
infringement or preemption provide, let alone Strate-Montana's highest
standard. It also has applied the preemption doctrine, based on the 1868
making no exception for non-Indian fee lands or rights-of-way so long as they fall within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation or the Eastern Navajo Agency, largely composed of
allotment and fee lands. Id.
233. The NNC allows no special appearance to contest jurisdiction; any appearance is a
general appearance and submission to the tribal court's jurisdiction. In any case, the effect is
the same. The party that makes a special appearance to contest jurisdiction and loses is
thereafter bound by the substantive proceedings in the case. The party who wins an objection
tojurisdiction before a court that does not permit special appearances achieves the goal: the case
terminates at that point.
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Treaty of Fort Sumner, in a way that provides a broad, durable source of civil
jurisdiction to the Navajo courts.
A body of recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation
deals with the jurisdiction question. They total more than all of those decided
by neighboring state courts combined, and they constitute a regular flow.
Winnowing through the Navajo case law presents a formidable task, but a
definitive body of law began to emerge in 2003. Several cases decided after
that date seem to form a complete doctrine of civil jurisdiction from the
Navajo perspective. Already, the Navajo Supreme Court has begun to cite
those cases as constituting settled doctrine and analysis.
First Consideration: Nelson v. Pfizer, Inc., and the Responsibility to
Protect Tribal Sovereignty against Infringement
The Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation began its calculated consideration
of its own civil jurisdiction in Nelson v. Pfizer, Inc.,2" handed down in 2003.
That date gave the tribal high court the opportunity to take into account all the
relevant decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States through Strate
and include them in its analysis. Pfizer was a products liability case brought
by a group of Navajo Reservation residents235 against the manufacturer of
Redulin, a medication used to treat diabetes, "a disease prevalent among
Native Americans., 236 The Navajo trial court applied the Strate-Montana test,
found neither of the exceptions present, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Navajo Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion that seems
calculated to serve as a seminal discussion of the question.
The Pfizer opinion, written by then Acting Chief Justice Lorene Ferguson,
begins by setting the Strate-Montana rule in its Navajo context and rejects its
application to civil matters arising on tribal lands.
The implications of Montana for the Navajo Nation's power
over its territory are clear .... There are many non-Indian actors
who impact the Navajo Nation in various and significant ways that
may escape the authority of the Navajo Nation if our courts are
required to apply the Montana exceptions to every civil case
involving non-Indians. . . .Further, application of Montana to
every civil case with a non-Indian defendant undermines the federal
234. Nelson v. Pfizer, Inc., 8 Navajo Rptr. 369 (2003).
235. The plaintiffs included only one person who was not an enrolled member of the Navajo
Nation.
236. Pfizer, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 373.
439
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policy encouraging the development of tribal courts. See Iowa
Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) ("Tribal courts
play a vital role in tribal self-government . . . and the federal
government has consistently encouraged their development.")...
Finally, our responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the Navajo
Nation counsels that we not surrender authority unnecessarily....
Based on these considerations, and the explicit restrictions in
Montana and later cases, including Hicks, we decline to extend
Montana to activity on tribal land. .. Hicks applies Montana in
the unique situation where the sovereign interests of a state
government enforcing state criminal law are at issue, and no
further. We decline to extend Hicks beyond the United States
Supreme Court's own limitation.237
In its Pfizer decision, the Navajo Supreme Court rejected the proposition
that Montana applied to a case in which non-Indian activities occurred on
tribal land.2"' The opinion sets out a checklist of "several sources" for tribal
court jurisdiction over non-Indians: 1) "its broad inherent sovereignty over
non-Indian conduct anywhere within its territory;" 2) "federal and state
statutes, regulations and intergovernmental agreements" delegating such
authority; 3) treaties that recognize such authority; and 4) "a tribe's authority
as landowner., 2
39
Pfizer held that the tribal court had jurisdiction because of inherent
sovereignty, thereby finding it unnecessary to consider the alternative
proposition argued by the plaintiff, delegation by treaty.24°
The opinion lists any number of aspects of the case that have significance
for the Navajo Nation, but never identifies precisely what specific factors
ultimately may have triggered inherent sovereignty.24 Instead, oracle-like, the
court states, "our subject matter jurisdiction over matters occurring on tribal
237. Id. at 376-77 (citations omitted). Pfizer took careful note of Hicks' statement that the
"existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough to support . . . jurisdiction over
nonmembers," but also noted that Hicks had "left open the issue of general civil authority"
when it specifically limited its holding to the "question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state
officers enforcing state law," preserving "the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over
nonmember defendants in general." Id. at 375-76 (citations omitted).
238. The Pfizer opinion barely cites Strate and does not discuss it, presumably because that
case applied Montana to events that did not occur on tribal lands.
239. Pfizer, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 374 (citations omitted).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 376.
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land is broad. ' 42 It is not a finding of exclusive jurisdiction, excluding all
possibility that a state might have heard the case, but of sufficient jurisdiction.
Further insight into Pfizer may be gained from its disposition regarding
tribal trial courts' use of the Strate-Montana rule. It "does not want to
discourage" tribal trial courts from utilizing the Strate-Montana exceptions,
since "fulfillment of either one will satisfy the lower threshold we hold applies
today., 243 In other words, if one of the Montana exceptions were present in a
given case, that would clearly justify tribal civil jurisdiction, but the
jurisdictional threshold is lower than that. Failing the exceptions, the analysis
must proceed to consider the lower threshold and the various sorts of factors
indicated in Pfizer, or, one surmises, any other aspects of the case that might
bear on the Navajo Nation's interest.
Pfizer seems to counsel Navajo trial courts, "Go ahead and use Strate-
Montana if you want to clear a higher bar and establish jurisdiction impeccable
beyond all doubt (and perhaps prepare for federal court review), but that
analysis is neither necessary nor dispositive. Strate-Montana is limited by its
particular facts and is subservient to much broader general criteria for
determining Navajo civil jurisdiction, depending on the facts of each case."
The Benchmark Established: Dale Nicholson Trust v. Chavez, and the
Extent of Preemption by Treaty
Within a year after the decision in Pfizer, the Navajo Supreme Court
produced another jurisdiction opinion, Dale Nicholson Trust v. Chavez.24 The
court seems to gather itself for a second, and more authoritative, visitation of
the question. In that case-Justice Ferguson again writing the opinion-a trust
involved "properties, assets and business operations within the Navajo
Nation," administered by a nonmember Indian trustee to benefit a member of
the Navajo tribe. State tax agents (five from New Mexico, one from Arizona)
issued Notices of Jeopardy Assessment against the assets of Rogers &
Mercantile, a business run by the trustee's son, alleging that its assets belonged
to the trust. Many of those assets were on the reservation. Despite the trust's
protestations that its assets and operations were separate from those of the
trustee's son, the states persisted in their intent to satisfy the trust's taxes
against Rogers & Mercantile's assets. The trust went before the Navajo
District Court seeking a temporary restraining order, injunctions, and other
242. Id. at 377.
243. Id.
244. 8 Navajo Rptr. 417 (2004).
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relief against the tax agents. The trial court found itself without jurisdiction,
but the Navajo Supreme Court overruled it.
The issue was whether the tribal court could "restrain state officials from
seizing property located within the Navajo Nation.""24 The Supreme Court of
the Navajo Nation drew a careful distinction as to what facts might establish
a basis for civil jurisdiction in the tribal court. "If the case concerns tribal
land, the plaintiff needs only to allege specific facts showing that the cause of
action arose on tribal land."2" .e., in such a fact situation there is no need to
seek a Strate-Montana exception, and tribal jurisdiction is clear. Justice
Ferguson noted that her Pfizer opinion had not considered the treaty basis for
tribal jurisdiction, since it based its result on inherent sovereignty.
Nonetheless, the 1868 Treaty of Fort Sumner, interpreted "as our ancestors
understood it," specifically recognized the Navajo Nation's "authority to
regulate all non-members, including non-Indians, other than certain federal
employees on its lands." '247 The treaty preempted the Strate-Montana test for
jurisdiction, therefore, so long as the claim arose on tribal land.248
Dale Nicholson recognizes still another potential distinction, however, and
then disposes of it as inapplicable to the Navajo Nation. The actions at issue
were those of state agents. Under Hicks, the Strate-Montana test would have
applied even on tribal lands where a plaintiff questioned state agents' activities
before the tribal court, so long as the civil jurisdiction of the tribal court rested
on nothing more than inherent sovereignty.249 Dale Nicholson held, however,
245. Id. at 423.
246. Id. at 425 (citing PacifiCorp v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 Navajo Rptr. 378, 385 (2003), and
Pfizer, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 376, and using the definition of "tribal land" in NAVAJO NATION CODE
tit. 7, § 254).
247. Id. at 428. The actual text of the Treaty of Fort Sumner with the Navajo Tribe, supra
note 38, at art. 2, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAiRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 1015, 1016 (Charles
Kappler ed., 1904), states that the reservation "shall be... set apart for the use and occupation
of the Navajo tribe of Indians." Perhaps one could dispute the claim that the text "specifically"
recognized the Navajo Nation's authority over all nonmembers on its lands. Apparently,
however, the Navajo court could read it as its "ancestors understood it" to reach that specific
conclusion, which is not implausible.
248. The court noted that Montana itself recognized such language in the 1868 Treaty of
Fort Laramie with the Crow Tribe, and Atkinson reiterated that power from the same treaty. See
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,558 (1981); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645, 650 (2001). Also in 1868, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe signed a treaty with the
federal government containing a similar power, as recognized in South Dakota v. Bourland, 508
U.S. 679,687-88 (1993). The Navajo Treaty of Fort Sumner of the same year "contains almost
identical language." Dale Nicholson Trust, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 429.
249. Dale Nicholson Trust, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 428.
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that whenever the tribal court exercises preemptive treaty-based jurisdiction,
it overrides any possible application of the Strate-Montana test. s0
Thus, in Navajo Nation courts, neither Strate-Montana nor Hicks should
ever apply to any claim that arises on Navajo tribal lands proper, since the
Treaty of 1868 preserved tribal sovereignty by a specific grant of civil
jurisdiction requiring only the territorial contact, regardless of who the parties
might be. "If the cause of action arises on non-Indian owned fee land within
the Navajo Nation, [however,] the plaintiff has a higher burden;"' viz., to
demonstrate one of the two Montana exceptions, as required by Strate and
Hicks.
When Dale Nicholson is read with Pfizer, the Supreme Court for the Navajo
Nation has established that its courts will exercise civil jurisdiction over events
occurring and/or parties acting on tribal land, without any need to demonstrate
infringement or a Strate-Montana exception. Inherent sovereignty, or-more
potently-the Treaty of 1868 that preempts any state exercise of civil
jurisdiction by granting to the Navajo Nation the continued existence of its
inherent sovereignty, provides the basis for such territorial jurisdiction.
A Further Bulwark to Navajo Jurisdiction: Allstate Indemnity Co. v.
Blackgoat, and the Application of Strate-Montana Exemptions
By the doctrine set out in Dale Nicholson, the only time Strate-Montana
exceptions become relevant is when events involving nonmember parties
occur on non-Indian land. That question came before the Supreme Court of
the Navajo Nation and Justice Ferguson in 2005 in Allstate Indemnity Co. v.
Blackgoat.252 Again, the opinion established guidelines for that situation. The
case dealt with a claim by the estate of an insured couple deceased in a traffic
accident on U.S. Highway 160 within the reservation. After some fruitless
negotiation, the insurer filed an interpleader with the tribal court, tendering the
maximum amount under the policy, $30,000. The estate claimed pre-judgment
interest beyond the cap amount, and the insurer objected that the court had no
jurisdiction to award it.
Allstate argued Strate-Montana applied. The Blackgoat court initially
accommodated the argument by assuming that "U.S. Highway 160 is the type
of right-of-way that requires a Montana analysis."2 3 Perhaps the Supreme
250. Id. at 428-29.
251. Id. at 425.
252. 8 Navajo Rptr. 660 (2005). Another aspect of the same case is decided at 8 Nav. Rep.
627 (2005).
253. Blackgoat, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 666. The court might have avoided the issue by holding
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Court of the Navajo Nation did not have to assume the possibility that the
Strate-Montana test applied. It could have ruled that the place of the accident
had nothing to do with jurisdiction to distribute insurance proceeds paid into
tribal court under interpleader instigated by the insurer." 4 Conceding the
assumption, however, allowed the court to cast its subsequent analysis against
the strongest point in Strate-Montana.
The Navajo Supreme Court found the first Strate-Montana exception, a
consensual relationship by Allstate in its contract with a Navajo tribal member.
The opinion goes further, however, to address whether the court's jurisdiction
might go beyond the simple distribution of the interpleaded funds, which
Allstate urged should be the limit of its consensual relationship and the court's
jurisdiction.255 The court felt that even if Strate-Montana defined its
jurisdiction, the test was not so restrictive. It reasoned that "the actual U.S.
Supreme Court test allows jurisdiction if the asserted jurisdiction has a 'nexus'
to a consensual relationship," citing Atkinson,256 and held that "the question
whether the cap provision precludes an award of pre-judgment interest clearly
has a nexus to the contract itself."257 That nexus created jurisdiction in the
that the place of the contract, not the place of the accident, controlled. As it turned out, the
court used a Strate-Montana exception (the insurer's consensual commercial contact) to find
jurisdiction based on the highest requirement.
It might also have adopted an approach similar to that of the New Mexico court in Tempest
Recovery, to the effect that the insurer chose the court and would have to abide by its law. See
supra note 197 and accompanying text.
254. The court complains in a footnote that, under questions from the bench,
[B]oth sides demonstrated a lack of understanding of [Nicholson Trust] and its
identification of the exclusion provision of the Treaty of 1868 as the source of
absolute jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal lands within the Navajo Nation.
... We state again that the Montana test is only relevant within the Navajo Nation
on non-Indian owned fee land or on certain types of rights-of-way. It is only the
fact that the accident occurred on a federal right-of-way that makes the Montana
test relevant to our jurisdiction over this case.
Id. at 666 n.2. Perhaps the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation extended itself with the
assumption in order to make a point.
255. Allstate supported its argument by citing Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170
(9th Cir. 2005), withdrawn upon reconsideration, 488 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2007), and Wilson
v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), which had rejected tribal jurisdiction over a
products liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer based on a finance agreement by the
manufacturer's subsidiary and a simple car accident between a tribal member and a non-Indian
driving through the reservation. The court distinguished the two cases on their "unique
circumstances... under the fact-intensive Montana test." Blackgoat, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 667.
256. See Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001).
257. Blackgoat, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 666.
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tribal court over the question of pre-judgment interest, even if the Strate-
Montana test controlled.5 8 The court then applied the "strong public policy
of the Navajo Nation" of ndly oh, under which "injured parties should be
compensated fully so that there are no hard feelings,, 259 to support an award
of pre-judgment interest against the insurer.
Final Touches: Application of the Doctrine in Subsequent Cases
Not much time has passed since the Navajo Supreme Court decided the
Dale Nicholson case, but it already seems to have become a solid precedent.
As frequently happens, when a court has occasion to address an issue
repeatedly it soon identifies the analysis best suited to the task, sharpens its
articulation of that analysis, and creates standing, formidable doctrine. Three
opinions decided in 2007 and another in late 2008 have given the tribal high
court the opportunity to confirm its body of jurisdictional doctrine and to
indicate how it is likely to apply it for the foreseeable future.
Navajo Employees of Nonmember Employers on the Reservation
Two cases dealt with the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA).6 °
Both cases cite Dale Nicholson and its finding of preemption based on the
1868 Treaty of Fort Sumner, z6 l turning to what appears to have become the
Navajo Supreme Court's touchstone of choice for the assertion of its civil
jurisdiction free from Strate-Montana and other inhibiting rules.262
258. Id. at 666-67.
259. Id. at 668. Lest the award of pre-judgment interest be seen as unique to Navajo law,
however, the court noted that "some [state] jurisdictions have awarded pre-judgment interest
beyond contractual liability caps by ruling such contractual caps may be overridden by public
policy considerations." Id. (citations omitted).
260. Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station, No. SC-CV-25-06 (Navajo Oct. 19, 2007),
available at http://www.navajocourts.org/NNCourtOpinions2007/14Leonard%2OThinn%20
v/o20Navajo%20Generating%/o20Station.pdf; Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Navajo Nation Labor
Comm'n, Nos. SC-CV-53-06, SC-CV-54-06 (Navajo Nov. 21,2007), available at http://www.
navajocourts.org/suctopinions.htm (follow "SC-CV-53-06 SC-CV-54-06" hyperlink).
261. Specifically, Article 2, which states that the lands designated for the Navajo
Reservation "shall be... set apart for the use and occupation of the Navajo Tribe of Indians."
Treaty of Fort Sumner with the Navajo Tribe, supra note 38, at art. 2.
262. Cedar Unified states unequivocally, "Under its Treaty authority, the Nation does not
have to fulfill the Montana test." See Cedar Unified, Nos. SC-CV-53-06, SC-CV-54-06, at 5
n.5 (further discussing the effect of the treaty basis for tribal jurisdiction and the way in which
it makes Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), in which the Fallon Paiute Tribe did not assert a treaty
right to exclude or exercise jurisdiction over state officials on Indian trust land, inapplicable to
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The two cases turned on whether the NPEA applied to non-Navajo entities
operating on Navajo trust lands: in the first case the Navajo granted a lease for
a power station to be built, maintained and operated by public utility
companies licensed by the State of Arizona; the second case involved two
school districts organized under Arizona state law operating schools under
lease within the Navajo Nation. In both cases, former employees of the
entities brought claims before the Navajo Nation Labor Commission, alleging
wrongful termination without just cause. In both cases, the employers objected
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, arguing a market basket of defenses.
They availed nothing, principally because at the outset the Navajo high court
cites Dale Nicholson for the proposition that, "Under the Treaty of 1868 the
Nation has authority to regulate non-Indian activity on trust lands. This power
is absolute ... ,263 The opinions reveal Dale Nicholson's application of the
Treaty of 1868 as a stout precedent, equal to the defense of tribal civil
jurisdiction whenever a controversy arises on tribal trust lands.
The two opinions nonetheless elaborate on the Dale Nicholson precedent,
measuring it against whether a lease agreement may waive the Nation's
authority to regulate employment;2" whether a federal court's application or
interpretation of Navajo law is binding on the tribal court;2 65 whether
employment contracts might waive the NPEA by a choice-of-law clause;266
whether state-certified or -licensed entities escape Navajo jurisdiction as
political subdivisions of the state and as non-Indian entities;2 67 whether school
districts enjoy special immunity, either as sovereign entities26 or by protection
of federal law269 or because the state is a necessary party to a suit against
them;27 and whether comity counsels deference to state law.271
Working carefully through the various issues presented in Thinn and Cedar
Unified, the Navajo Supreme Court takes the opportunity to dispel any thought
that it might act as a servile tribunal overwhelmed by deeper legal
the Navajo Nation).
263. Thinn, No. SC-CV-25-06, at 4 (citation omitted); see Cedar Unified, Nos. SC-CV-53-
06, SC-CV-54-06, at 5.
264. Thinn,No. SC-CV-25-06, at 3,4, 5-10; Cedar Unified, Nos. SC-CV-53-06, SC-CV-54-
06, at 6-7.
265. Thinn, No. SC-CV-25-06, at 4, 10-12.
266. Cedar Unified, Nos. SC-CV-53-06, SC-CV-54-06, at 2, 3, 9-10.
267. Id. at 3, 4-7.
268. Id. at 3, 7-8.
269. Id. at 3, 10-12.
270. Id. at 3, 8-9.
271. Id. at 3, 12.
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complexities, inclined to turn civil jurisdiction over to state courts or to defer
to federal and state law as appropriate limitations on its own exercise. While
it would permit waiver of tribal authority, it will not find it lightly, requiring
"clear, unmistakable words of the Council or its properly empowered designee
[to] waive governmental authority. 2 72 It further has no difficulty in finding
that "the NPEA prohibits employees and employers from waiving the act by
contract, ' '273 rendering choice-of-law clauses invalid as against public policy.
274
In the same way a state court would not, the tribal court will not defer to a
federal court's reading of its laws. 275 And, finally, while the Navajo Supreme
Court has utilized comity to apply "another sovereign's" law,276 "a strong
Navajo policy justifies rejection.2 77
The Navajo Long Arm and Dram Shop Liability
The third 2007 case, Navajo Transport Services v. Schroeder,78 raised the
question of personal jurisdiction under the Navajo long-arm statute. Personal
jurisdiction had merited a passing mention at the end of the Pfizer opinion, a
simple acknowledgment that due process requirements applied without any
effort to define how far the long arm of Navajo jurisdiction might reach. 9 In
Navajo Transport the issue came front and center. The Eagle Claw Trading
Post and Liquor Store, located in Colorado off the reservation, sold alcohol to
Navajo tribal members who then got into a car and hit a vehicle belonging to
the plaintiff, who sued the trading post under the Navajo Nation's dram shop
statute.28 °
272. Thinn, No. SC-CV-25-06, at 5.
273. Cedar Unified, Nos. SC-CV-53-06, SC-CV-54-06, at 9.
274. Id. at 10.
275. Id. at 10-12. "Like interpretations of state law by the highest court of a state, federal
courts must defer to this Court's interpretation of Navajo law." Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
276. Bradley v. Lake Powell Medical Center, No. SC-CV-55-05 (Navajo Feb. 16, 2007),
available athttp://www.navajocourts.org/suctopinions.htm (follow "SC-CV-55-05" hyperlink),
(holding that the Navajo Nation Labor Commission should have granted comity to a decision
by the Arizona Department of Economic Security Office of Appeals that an employee's
discharge was based on his willful conduct).
277. Cedar Unified, Nos. SC-CV-53-06, SC-CV-54-06, at 12.
278. No. SC-CV-44-06 (Navajo Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.navajocourts.
org/suctopinions.htm (follow "SC-CV-44-06 " hyperlink).
279. Earlier Navajo cases had discussed personal jurisdiction in detail, but not since more
recent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Sells v. Espil, 6 Navajo Rptr.
195 (1990); Billie v. Abbott, 6 Navajo Rptr. 66 (1988).
280. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 207 (1995). This provision was amended and
renumbered in 2003. See NAvAiO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 631 (2005) (but the accident at bar
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The plaintiff invoked NNC's long-arm statute281 to take personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The defendant resisted, filing a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion,
based on detailed allegations in the complaint that met the "minimum
contacts" test. After discovery, however, defendants filed for summary
judgment, again arguing lack of personal jurisdiction. This time the Kayenta
trial court granted the motion, apparently following federal and state cases that
had found a lack of minimum contacts where border town liquor stores had not
advertised in the destination state.282
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation first took to task the
district court for failing to include the facts on which it relied, and might well
have remanded on those grounds alone.283 Of greater interest for our analysis
here, the court went on to address "a separate problem" on remand, the trial
court's failure to make a careful analysis of Navajo Nation law, "because the
bare application of federal interpretations of 'minimum contacts' ignores the
clear policy of the Navajo Nation Council on alcohol." Not only does the
NNC prohibit alcohol on the Nation, 284 and include a dram shop act,2 85 but the
NNC long-arm provision includes a specific section asserting personal
jurisdiction over off-reservation merchants whose liquor causes accidents on
the Navajo Nation.1 6 The court instructed, "Given the clear mandate of the
long arm statute, the District Court would have to find the statute invalid as a
violation of Appellee's due process rights under the Navajo Bill of Rights."287
Lest the implication be lost, the court's opinion made it clear that the U.S.
Constitution's Due Process Clause did not provide a direct analogy.288 The
operative question was
whether the [Navajo] long arm statute is consistent with Navajo
concepts of fairness embedded in the Due Process Clause of the
Navajo Bill of Rights. As stated previously by this Court, the
Navajo concept of due process is unique, in that it applies concepts
occurred before the amendment).
281. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 253a (2005).
282. Navajo Transport, No. SC-CV-44-06, at 2.
283. Id. at 4-5.
284. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, §§ 410-412.
285. See supra note 223.
286. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 253a(C)(8).
287. Navajo Transport, No. SC-CV-44-06, at 6.
288. Id. at 6-7.
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of fairness consistent with Navajo values.., to be interpreted in
light of Navajo Fundamental Law. 89
The Navajo Transport case, according to the court's opinion, presented "a
matter of first impression., 290 It falls nicely into the jurisdictional construct
emerging in recent years and complements the Dale Nicholson doctrine of
preemptive sovereignty. While the Navajo Supreme Court's opinion does not
dictate a finding of personal jurisdiction by the Kayenta District Court, it does
instruct the lower court to contemplate the special Navajo concern against
alcohol and its effects on the Nation's lands and to seek a concept responsive
to special Navajo concepts of fairness. It does seem to reject the proposition
that the matter is settled or even particularly illuminated by what might be a
"universal view of modern state courts."'29'
Post Plains Commerce Bank Application
Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Navajo Supreme Court released its
opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. Kayenta District Court.29 2  The decision
demonstrates the hearty exercise of assertive jurisdiction by Navajo tribal
courts continues unabated after Plains Commerce Bank, for which the tribal
court specifically delayed its decision so that the parties could provide
supplemental briefs. FordMotor shows a Navajo Supreme Court well settled
and secure in its jurisdictional doctrine, again applying it to find jurisdiction.
The case began when a tribal police officer died because of a defective
seatbelt when her vehicle overturned while she was on duty on the reservation.
Her parents brought a wrongful death claim in tribal court. The jurisdictional
issue, on Ford's motion to dismiss, came before the tribal trial court, the
federal District Court for the District of Arizona,293 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit once, 294 and then again on a petition for
289. Id. at 7.
290. Id. at 6.
291. Id. at 4 n.5. The Navajo Supreme Court does not reject reference to state and federal
court opinions. It distinguishes the cases that the district court relied on, noting that only one
of four concerned an actual liquor store and that another state case had found personal
jurisdiction in similar circumstances. Id. The court also notes that federal concepts of due
process may be considered but are not controlling. Id. at 7-8.
292. No. SC-CV-33-07 (Navajo Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.navajocourts.org
/NNCourtOpinions2008/Ford%20v.%20Kayenta.pdf.
293. Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 221 F. Supp.2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2002).
294. Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2005)
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rehearing.295 On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its earlier holding
against jurisdiction and required Ford to seek review before the Navajo
Supreme Court on the issue of whether the second Montana exception
applied.296 When the tribal high court took the case, it applied its highly-
developed jurisdictional analysis. Ford Motor thus provides the most recent
benchmark on Navajo doctrine and how the tribal court handles the federal
Indian law of jurisdiction up to and including Plains Commerce Bank.
The Navajo Supreme Court required the parties to address "an additional
question[:] whether the Treaty of 1868 ... provides an independent ground for
the Nation's courts to hear the case under the right of inherent sovereignty,"'2 97
incorporating and overriding the second Montana exception. The court leaves
no doubt that it relies on the 1868 Treaty of Fort Sumner "as the primary
source of the Nation's authority over non-Indians within the Nation,""29 citing
Dale Nicholson Trust for the proposition that Article II of the Treaty
"specifically recognizes the Navajo Nation's authority to regulate all non-
members other than certain federal employees on its lands."2 99
The tentative recitation of diverse, undeveloped sources for tribal civil
jurisdiction in Pfizer"' seems far behind. Within six years from that 2003
case, Navajo jurisdictional doctrine has focused on preemptive sovereignty
based on the 1868 treaty. Unless and until the Supreme Court of the United
States takes that jurisdictional reference away from the Nation,"' it can trump
295. Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 488 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2007)
296. Id.
297. FordMotor, No. SC-CV-33-07, at 3.
298. Id. at 4.
299. Id. at 6. As noted above, the specific language in the Navajo Treaty of Fort Sumner of
1868 states that the reservation shall be set apart for the "use and occupation of the Navajo tribe
of Indians," perhaps a less specific reference to jurisdiction than the court's opinion might
represent. See supra note 247.
300. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
301. Such a decision might be difficult. See Todecheene, No. SC-CV-33-07, at 7-8. In
1868, the federal government executed several treaties with similar language. The court notes
that Montana itself recognized the preemptive effect of language like that in the Navajo Treaty
of 1868 in the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Tribe. Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 558 (1981), and Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 650 (2001),
reiterated that power from the same treaty. Also in 1868 the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
signed a treaty with the federal government containing a similar power, as recognized in South
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1993). As Dale Nicholson Trust noted, after citing
the same cases, the Navajo Treaty of Fort Sumner of the same year "contains almost identical
language." Dale Nicholson Trust v. Chavez, 8 Navajo Rptr. 417, 429 (2004); see supra notes
247-50 and accompanying text.
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almost any objection to its exercise of civil jurisdiction over parties on its
tribal lands, even when contacts rather than physical presence create the
connection.
Despite its confident articulation of "inherent sovereignty" (read preemptive
sovereignty) doctrine in Ford Motor,3"2 the Navajo Supreme Court also attends
to the United States Supreme Court precedents in its opinion. It carefully
notes that no Supreme Court case has dealt with facts like those in Ford Motor
and dismisses Plains Commerce Bank on the Supreme Court's own terms, as
a "sale of non-tribal land between nonmembers. 30 3  It also adopts the
venerated minimum contacts test to measure the tribal court's assertion of
jurisdiction over Ford.3° It engages in a careful, detailed analysis of Ford's
business activity and the reasonable expectation that claims arising from such
activity would subject the company to jurisdiction before the tribal court.3"5
Ultimately, the Ford Motor opinion "finds that Montana does not apply in this
case," but nonetheless states that it "believes that both Montana exceptions are
met,' 3 and devotes several pages to that analysis.30 7
The Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation 's Clear Articulation of Well-
Developed Doctrine Pertaining to Their Tribal Courts' Civil Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction: Focus on Preemptive Sovereignty Under the Treaty of 1868
Withal, the Navajo Supreme Court has defined a complete doctrine for
approaching questions of tribal jurisdiction over civil matters and demonstrates
an ever-surer grasp in disposing of the steady stream of jurisdictional cases
that have come to it in the last few years. It initially set a broad base for such
jurisdiction in Pfizer, noting multiple criteria while specifically finding
inherent sovereignty, without explaining very well what it meant. By the time
of Dale Nicholson, it had focused on the strongest among several factors: the
preemptive grant of sovereignty in the Treaty of 1868, which it since has
steadfastly referred to as "inherent sovereignty." That grant enables all that
follows. Beyond doubt, Congress has plenary power to invest any tribal court
system with preemptive full sovereignty. The Navajo Supreme Court has held
that Congress long ago gave the Navajo Nation courts preemptive full
sovereignty when it ratified the Treaty of Fort Sumner in 1868.
302. Todechenee, No. SC-CV-33-07, at 4.
303. Id. at 7.
304. Id. at 8 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
305. Id. at 2, 9.
306. Id. at 10.
307. Id. at 10-13.
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Preemptive sovereignty is a doctrine for all seasons and empowers the
Navajo Nation as no other source of sovereignty could. It escapes the noisome
Strate-Montana rule and nullifies Hicks. It permits the Navajo Supreme Court
to implement a full-blown, autonomous legal system with courts of general
civil jurisdiction whose judges in particular may assert the special nature and
sources of Navajo law.
The Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation's recent jurisdictional cases (since
2003, culminating first in Dale Nicholson Trust and now in Ford Motor) set
out a clear view of tribal doctrine with regard to civil jurisdiction, both subject
matter and personal. The Navajo Nation's highest court has mastered United
States Supreme Court case law and is not bashful about applying it in ways
that take its own civil jurisdiction out to permissible limits. All of the
elements are in place for expansive tribal jurisdiction: a legislative basis for
long-arm jurisdiction in the NNC; °s a Treaty of 1868 whose language
preserves civil jurisdiction to the Navajo Nation, preempting any exclusivity
in state jurisdiction and overcoming any limiting presumptions in Strate-
Montana or Hicks;3 9 recognition of a still vigorous inherent sovereignty,
3 10
alert against infringement; and judicial recognition of an overall
"responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation."31'
When one traces the doctrine from Pfizer to Dale Nicholson to Blackgoat
to Navajo Transport to Ford Motor, it becomes clear that the Strate-Montana
test cannot-at least in the vision of the Supreme Court of the Navajo
Nation--curtail the civil jurisdiction of Navajo tribal courts save in the limited
circumstance of a non-Indian defendant for activities arising on non-Indian
lands. Even then, when one of the two Strate-Montana exceptions must be
present to create jurisdiction, the Navajo court seems prepared to read those
exceptions expansively, asserting personal jurisdiction based on minimum
contacts that correspond to Navajo, rather than federal, sensitivities.
At the further extension of developing Navajo doctrine, the Blackgoat and
Navajo Transport cases are particularly suggestive of the possible special
considerations within Navajo law that may control when Navajo civil
jurisdiction does apply, and even provide the basis for that jurisdiction."
308. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
311. Nelson v. Pfizer, Inc., 8 Navajo Rptr. 369, 376 (2003).
312. They are by no means the only such recent cases. In 2008, the Supreme Court of the
Navajo Nation showed further implications of Navajo law for jurisdictional purposes when it
decided a preliminary procedural matter in Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Duncan, No. SC-
CV-46-05 (Navajo Aug. 18,2008), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/suctopinions.htm
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Both cases utilize concepts of public policy drawn from Navajo Common, or
Fundamental, Law and raise the possibility that Navajo tribal courts in some
cases might resolve a case involving the same parties and circumstances
differently than might be expected in state court.
Points of Coincidence and Divergence Between Navajo and Arizona Case
Law: Two Assertive Courts and the Possibilities of Concurrent Jurisdiction
Reading Dale Nicholson against Zaman I demonstrates the disparity
between the Navajo Nation and Arizona case law. The Navajo Supreme Court
recognizes multiple sources of jurisdictional authority over non-Indians and
manifests a disposition to apply them assertively in favor of tribal civil
jurisdiction. It focuses on finding positive bases for jurisdiction in the Navajo
Nation, without attempting to formulate reasons for excluding the state. It is
more thoughtful in its treatment of the United States Supreme Court cases;
more substantive, and definitely concerned with the facts of each case. If Dale
Nicholson's preemption approach is not sufficient, Pfizer earlier provides a
reference to several sources of tribal civil jurisdiction carefully gleaned from
the United States Supreme Court cases, and commends a rigorous-but
ultimately subjective-multi-factor analysis for inherent sovereignty.
The nature of the exercise dictates that the Arizona Supreme Court also
focus on the bases for Navajo jurisdiction, rather than any concern for state
interests per se, a perspective it has used in Zaman I to propound the
formalistic rule that where a non-Indian defendant is involved in a state court
suit brought by an Indian, there can be no tribal concerns, since only the
individual rights of a single Indian are at issue and that Indian has chosen not
(follow "SC-CV-46-05" hyperlink). Plaintiff, a national lender specializing in mobile homes,
asked for enforcement of an arbitration clause in its financing contract with defendant. State
courts generally defer to arbitration clauses, but the tribal court required the parties to submit
supplemental briefs to address the issue of whether the arbitration clause violated Navajo public
policy, id. at 2, specifically in light of the test for validity of contract provisions applied in the
Blackgoat decision, id. at 8. Apparently, the court referred to that part of the Blackgoat opinion
that tested against Navajo public policy--specifically the Fundamental Law concept of
nalyeh-the validity of an insurance policy provision to cap recovery by the insured. In Green
Tree, the question would be whether any Navajo public policy or Fundamental Law might
invalidate the arbitration clause, taking into account title 5A, section 2-203 of the Navajo
Uniform Commercial Code's provisions on unconscionable contracts, id. at 9-10; the
Fundamental Law principles of h6zh6 6g6, requiring "meaningful notice and explanation of a
right before a waiver of that right is effective," id. at 10, iishjdni 6doonil, "making something
clear or obvious," id. at 11, and finally, "the context of the importance of a home in Navajo
thinking," id. at 12.
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to assert them. As the majority in Zaman H would later state, "the status of the
defendant as an Indian or a non-Indian is the sine qua non of federal Indian
law." 3  Nowhere do the United States Supreme Court cases make either
statement, and its categorical assertion by the Arizona Supreme Court would
seem ill-advised in an area fraught with subjective judgments as to when
inherent tribal sovereignty may be infringed, or state court jurisdiction
preempted, or when a non-Indian may have formed a consensual relationship
with a tribe or its members, or when the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within a reservation might threaten or have some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of a tribe.3 14
One characteristic seems common to both Arizona Supreme Court and
Navajo Supreme Court criteria, however. They have both gravitated to
doctrine-albeit opposing doctrine-that favors exercise of the broadest
possible subject matter jurisdiction by their own civil courts. Of course, this
may simply mean that concurrent jurisdiction is the most frequent result, a
circumstance that mirrors jurisdiction between two states which both have
contacts with the events and parties that give rise to a lawsuit. Since
"American Law" will control in such situations and usually render the same
or a similar resolution in either state court, the jurisdictional question often is
not of great moment. When the concurrent jurisdiction includes the Navajo
Nation, however, parties may find themselves in situations where the first
question of which court will hear the case will also call in to question the
outcome, since the applicable law comes with the jurisdiction and is not the
same in both courts.
The disparity in analysis between tribal court and state court illustrates the
effect of concurrent jurisdiction. In Dale Nicholson and in Zaman I, the
deciding court needed only resolve the question of whether it had jurisdiction,
not whether another court did concurrently. If either court had decided that it
did not have jurisdiction, that decision would have constituted recognition of
exclusive jurisdiction in the other court. Perhaps that insight provides a way
to reconcile the Navajo and Arizona approaches: they both represent
resolutions that protect jurisdiction over cases filed in their courts, without
313. State v. Zaman, 984 P.2d 528, 528 (Ariz. 1999).
314. Another recent Navajo case, dealing with the custody of an inscribed Navajo child,
shows how the Navajo court approaches an issue similar to that in Zaman I Although the father
was not a Navajo and had taken the child off the Reservation to live in five different states in
five years, when the mother instituted divorce proceedings in the tribal court, it took jurisdiction
of the custody issue, too. Miles v. Miles, No. SC-CV-04-08 (Navajo Feb. 21, 2008), available
at http://www.navajocourts.org/suctopinions.htm (follow "SC-CV-04-08" hyperlink).
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taking away the jurisdictional possibility that the plaintiff could have filed in
the other court. Neither court, at the end of the day, concedes exclusive
jurisdiction to the other, but neither does their analysis foreclose the possibility
of concurrent jurisdiction. The issue of concurrent jurisdiction simply is not
before either court, nor is it necessary to either result.
Has a state or tribal court improperly taken jurisdiction where not
concurrent, but exclusive, jurisdiction resides in the other? The truest test
would be enforcement of judgments, since the enforcing court may refuse to
enforce a judgment rendered without proper jurisdiction. In the Zaman cases,
for example, should the defendant have continued to reside on the reservation,
the judgment creditor probably would have had to come on tribal land to
enforce the judgment. In such a case, the effort to enforce a judgment gives
the enforcement jurisdiction a subsequent, and definitive, bite at the
jurisdictional apple and the opportunity to say to the rendering court, "This
case was ours. You never should have taken jurisdiction. You had none. You
applied the Supreme Court doctrine improperly, but we will now remedy that
mistake by denying enforcement of yourjudgment." Even that case, however,
represents a unilateral resolution to overcome a unilateral resolution.
The Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of the
Navajo Nation
The United States Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter, but it cannot sort
out every case. That leaves a large area of civil jurisdiction to development
by state and tribal courts, and opens the possibility for significant variations
in jurisdictional assertiveness from state to state to tribal court. The Dine's
legal system is not a prototype, although other tribes might well consider it
worthy of imitation. There is no archetypical tribal system. There may well
be other tribes possessing similar elements to their legal systems. There may
well be other tribes whose legal systems deserve analysis. We here focus on
the Navajo Nation, because its still developing legal system lends itself
especially well to showing how its judicial aspirations may be defined by the
civil jurisdiction that its courts may exercise. The Navajo legal system may
appear to an "American" lawyer as an unlikely mixed jurisdiction that blends
pre-Columbian indigenous, consensual traditions with "American" Common
Law, adversary traditions. The Navajo Nation has assimilated the old with the
new. The Navajo legal system has become a successful, functioning, vital,
developing legal system. It will exercise civil jurisdiction over controversies
involving contacts with the Navajo Nation for a long time. Tribal case law has
not yet established the precise limits of that jurisdiction, but it does
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demonstrate a sure and expansive vision. That vision should light the path
ahead.
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